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4SUMMARY
Most of my academic background is from psychological disciplines, thus, my 
focus also within the thematic field of peace and conflict resolution tends to be 
on psychological processes and how humans respond to and address the various 
issues involved in large scale conflicts. The hostility that emerges between 
conflictants in deep seated conflicts, such as the one in Israel/Palestine, is one of 
my major concerns.
The contact hypothesis proposes that interaction of different groups 
reduces intergroup prejudice if certain optimal conditions are present (e.g. 
Allport, 1958). Critics, though, have pointed to the danger of research built on 
the contact hypothesis of Gordon Allport being applicable only in rare contexts, 
under highly idealized conditions (e.g. Dixon et al. 2005: 1). The generalisation 
of such research may not be useful in specific contexts where these conditions 
are lacking. When applied to areas of conflict, other issues and mechanisms 
related to the specific area or region, may affect the outcome of the processes in 
ways that are not presented in the generalized theories. 
Changing attitudes and prejudices that in part pertain to whole nations is 
not easy. I hope through this study to complement theories on peacebuilding 
and conflict resolution by adding knowledge of the reduction of prejudice in 
protracted or intractable conflicts. The change of attitudes and prejudice is the 
focus of analysis in this thesis. A case study of the Middle East Program for 
young leaders (MEP) is at the heart of the discussion. The objective of this 
program is to: "Encourage and empower young Palestinian, Israeli and 
Jordanian future leaders (men and women) to develop a common direction 
towards peace and to create a sustainable movement for a better future in the 
Middle East." 1 (MEP- Note). Information about the program can also be found 
on their website2 and the website of the Abildso Foundation3.
In the thesis I compare findings from the MEP case to theories on the 
optimal contact strategy, inspired by the early work of Allport, and further 
developed by a variety of social psychologists through the last fifty years. I also 
compare the findings from the case to theories on conflict resolution, focusing 
on interactive conflict resolution, inspired by the work of e.g. Burton, Azar and 
Kelman, and formulated and reviewed by Fisher (1997).  Through this I hope to 
address some important issues of conflict resolution by the use of knowledge 
and methods from the psychological disciplines.
1 The logo on the front page: “We make a difference”, is made by the MEP participants and symbolizes the three 
core values of the program: Commitment (I will), Compassion (U can) & Courage (WE must).
2 http://mep.abildso.org/
3 http://abildso.org/
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61 Introduction
1.1. THE PURPOSE OF THE THESIS
In her report "Peacemaking Is a Risky Business", Hilde Henriksen Waage (2004) 
emphasises how even seemingly good intentions can contribute to the failures of 
making good settlements for peace. Asymmetrical relationships and a lack of 
understanding of the different parties' agendas and wills can give solutions that do not, 
in the end, result in peace or put an end to violence. This may happen even when there 
has been established a 'channel' through which talks and negotiations are made 
possible. Attitudes and prejudice are concepts used to explain the psychological 
processes that affect the way we think about people's thoughts and actions. In violent 
conflicts, these attitudes have a tendency to polarize and harden in a way that biases 
the perception of the other. This can make the road to a settlement or a peaceful 
agreement much longer than is often the case between neighbouring parties that know 
each other by friendlier terms. 
1.1.1 Concepts & Definitions: Intractable- and Protracted Social Conflicts (PSCs)
Conflict is an important aspect of social change, and conceived to be a positive aspect 
of developing a 'healthy' culture of change and development in a specific community 
or organization. Adrian Furnham (1997), addressing conflicts at work and within 
organizations, argues that "the presence or absence of conflict is most dysfunctional 
when at extremes: complete absence of conflict is probably unhealthy; just as high 
levels can be very destructive. Conflict has to be managed."(Furnham, 1997: 384). 
Underlining the difference between conflict and violence, Galtung & Tschudi (2002) 
argue that: "Conflict is ubiquitous, violence is not. Hence the big question: How can 
we approach conflict in a non-violent way?" (Galtung & Tschudi, 2002: 151). Miall, 
Ramsbotham & Woodhouse (2005), adds to this argument that; "the way we deal with 
conflict is a matter of habit and choice. It is possible to change habitual responses and 
exercise intelligent choices" (Miall et al. 2005: 13).
The word conflict comes from the Latin conflictus: "striking together with 
force" (Forsyth, 1999: 236). Conflicts between groups or intergroup conflicts can be
defined as: "Disagreement, discord or friction between the members of two or more 
7groups" (Forsyth, 1999: 236). In the conflict triangle of Galtung (1969a; 1996), the 
relationship between conflict, violence and peace is explained by pointing at three 
different but interrelated causes of conflict. These are:
• attitudes or assumptions, 
• behaviour and
• contradictions (Figure 1.1). 
In his model, attitudes are said to consist of three elements: emotive- (feeling); 
cognitive- (thinking) and conative (will) elements, as to say, they encompass your 
thoughts and feelings and motivations for acting or not acting in certain ways. 
Behaviour refers to how the parties do act, as by e.g. coercion or cooperation or by 
hostility and threats. Contradiction refers to the underlying conflict situation or where 
the parties' positions differ (Galtung, 1969a:486-491; Galtung, 1996: 70-72). 
Figure 1.1 Galtung’s model of conflict  and violence.
Source: Miall et al. 2005 (10, figure 1.1) 
Galtung relates different concepts of violence to the different corners of the 
triangle. Structural violence is related to the contradictions. This concept refers to 
situations when the structures of society cause people to die or suffer. Poverty or 
being denied access to democratic institutions and society structures, that could have 
enhanced your quality of living, is encompassed by this same definition. The term 
social injustice has also been used to describe such events (Galtung, 1969b; Galtung 
1990)
Direct violence, also referred to as personal violence, where people are killed 
or hurt by physical means is related to behaviour. In these cases one can also say that 
there is a somatic aspect to the suffering (ibid: 174). Cultural violence, or what makes 
us justify or choose to perform the differing forms of violence, is related to attitudes 
8(Galtung, 1990).  By the definitions of Galtung, 'negative peace' is the cessation of 
direct violence and 'positive peace' is the overcoming of structural and cultural 
violence as well (Galtung, 1996:2). Our responses in trying to resolve the conflict are 
depending on which of the causes we seek to change or remove.
The studies of interpersonal (between individuals), intragroup (within groups) 
and intergroup (between groups) conflicts all talk of conflicts that are addressed at 
different levels of society. This makes it necessary to distinguish between such 
conflicts at the micro level, within families, neighbourhoods and local communities; 
and conflicts at a macro level, involving larger groups. Conflicts between nations or 
ethnic groups at the international arena represent such macro level conflicts. 
Following the argument of Lederach (1997), most current wars are intrastate 
affairs where "the primary issues of conflict concern governance and often involve the 
pursuit of autonomy or self-government for certain regions or groups" (Lederach, 
1997:8). Lederach points out that identity conflicts  may be the most suitable name for 
such conflicts, as they often are the result of failure in governing structures to "address 
fundamental needs, provide space for participation in decisions, and ensure an 
equitable distribution of resources and benefits that makes identification with a group 
so attractive and salient in a given setting" (Ibid). Such conflicts, in contrast to 
conflicts at the micro level, address questions and disputes that are of a political 
nature, and can be termed political conflicts. 
Although some would argue that many conflicts evolve around goals that are 
falsely conceived to be incompatible (e.g. Galtung & Tschudi, 2002:151), political 
conflicts have been defined as: “The pursuit of incompatible goals by different 
groups” (Miall et al., 2005: 27). However, this definition is quite vague. It refers to 
any political conflict, whether it is pursued by peaceful means or by the use of force, 
but it does not say much about the content of the conflict or its dynamics. Another 
way to approach the concept of conflict is by identifying the issues of dispute4. This 
can be done by distinguishing between 1) positions held by the parties, 2) underlying 
needs and 3) interests (Ibid: 18). Some analysts also identify basic human needs as 
identity, security and survival, and say that these are lying at the roots of other 
4 Dispute, conflict and contradictions are used interchangeably in this thesis.
9motives for conflict (e.g. Burton, 1990; Azar, 1990). It is important to define the roots 
of the conflict in order to define the conflict and by this find a proper way of 
addressing the issues of dispute. 
The terms intractable-, protracted- and protracted social conflicts (PSCs) are 
used interchangeably in the literature. These conflicts are seen to result from the 
denial of basic needs. Edward E. Azar argues that the most important factor related to 
protracted social conflicts is "the communal content of a society" (Azar, 1990: 7). 
According to him: "individuals strive to fulfil their developmental human needs 
through the formation of identity groups" (Ibid). A community is one example of such 
groups. He has developed a model of the genesis and dynamics of Protracted Social 
Conflicts (Figure 1.2). Through the colonial legacy and historical formation of a 
certain region, multicommunal societies rise. These societies have to address the 
different needs of the often multicultural or multiethnic communities as shown in the 
frames of the diagram. How this is done is depending on the capacities of the state as 
well as dependencies on external actors. The neglect or disproportionate management 
of such issues may purge the development of PSCs as shown in figure 1.3.Many 
authors point to PSCs as the greatest challenges of peacebuilding efforts.
Lederach says about intractable or protracted conflicts5 that they are: 
"characterized by deep-rooted and long-standing animosities that are reinforced by 
high levels of violence and direct experiences of atrocities. As a result, psychological 
and even cultural features often drive and sustain the conflict more than substantive 
issues". This is in line with the reasoning also of Johan Galtung (1969a). 
The Israeli/Palestinian conflict is a typical example of such conflicts. The people 
on both sides of the conflict are deprived of basic human needs. The Palestinians are
deprived of acceptance needs, access needs and security needs. The Israelis are 
deprived of security needs. In addition the Israelis have their historical heritage of 
thousands of years of deprivation of all three categories of needs, acceptance- and 
security needs in particular. These issues are amplified in chapter three.
5 Concepts used interchangeably (Lederach, 1997: 14)
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Figure 1.2 Azar's model of the Sources of PSCs. 
Source: Fisher, 1997 (84, figure 4.1)
Figure 1.3 Potential outcomes of PSCs.
Source: Fisher, 1997 (86, figure 4.2) 
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The sociopolitical reality of intractable conflicts, regarding the issues of land, 
political-, civil- and economic rights (Salomon, 2004: 273) is an important aspect as it 
represents the basis for the contradictions or disputes of such conflicts.
Because the root causes of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict are outside the scope of this 
thesis, though, the dynamics of protracted social conflicts as described by Azar will 
not be discussed further in this thesis. The sociopolitical reality will only be discussed 
in relation to the sociopsychological reality, regarding identity, history, and the story a 
group of people tells about itself, about its role in the conflict and their views of the 
adversary (Salomon, 2004: 273.). This part of the conflict relates to the attitude part of 
the conflict triangle of Galtung, and how these may result in cultural violence. Even 
though, this aspect is closely linked to both structural and direct violence, the theories 
of Lederach and Galtung are more relevant for the purpose of this thesis, in their focus 
on the psychological and cultural features and their impact on the conflict. The 
historical background for the Israeli /Palestinian conflict is important in understanding 
these aspects. The sociopsychological reality of the conflict can be discussed in 
relation to how they are portrayed in the collective narratives of the two sides. This is 
done in later chapters.
According to Polkinghorne (1997); "Narrative is the discourse structure in which 
human action receives its form and through which it is meaningful (Polkinghorne, 
1997: 135). Kacowicz (2005) explains narratives with references to linguistics and 
literature, and he defines it as: "a fundamental way of organizing human experience 
and explaining human behaviour, and…a tool for constructing models of reality" 
(Kacowicz, 2005: 344). The concept is near to ideas labelled as 'beliefs', 
'interpretations', 'attitudes', 'values' and 'rationalizations' (Ibid: 345). According to 
Kacowicz, narratives in international relations: "tend to reflect different images and 
perceptions of the different actors, about themselves and about their environment" 
(Kacowicz, 2005: 345), in turn these sometimes lead to misperceptions by e.g. leaders 
and decision-makers (e.g. Jervis, 1970; Levy, 1983). Kacowicz argues that narratives 
are polarizing in the times of conflict in a way that they portray antagonists6 as the 
once violating social norms, at the same time as protagonists are seen to do the exact 
6 The ones you are in conflict with.
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opposite. This leads to tendencies of black-and-white dichotomies, driven by 
attribution errors, "where enemy images are persevered" (Kacowicz, 2005: 345). 
Researchers discussing the Israeli/Palestinian conflict heavily emphasise that the 
conflicting narratives of the Israelis and Palestinians have to be addressed if 
coexistence in the region is going to be a life in peace (Kahlidi, 1997; Pappe, 2004; 
Salomon, 2004; Said, 2000). Differences in collective narratives are common in 
protracted or intractable conflicts. This adds to the importance of addressing these 
narratives in the thesis.
1.1.2 Why Study a Specific Case?
Peacebuilding efforts in intractable conflicts have been criticized for its lack of 
research and evaluations of the different programs in the different regions. Salomon 
and Nevo (1999), discussing the efforts in evaluating such work, argue that: "Peace 
education, although carried out in a great variety of programs all over the world for at 
least 30 years, has yet to see its legitimate share of conceptual development and 
research activity" (Salomon & Nevo, 1999:1). The relevance of research on peace 
processes and grassroot peace work has increased with the number of ethnic and 
international conflicts that are now calling for outside help (Bercovitch, 1997: 149). 
Bercovitch, among others, has emphasised the importance of also evaluating and 
collecting information from specific cases. According to him, this is important 
because of the varying interactions and climates that take place in the specific 
processes and 'rounds of talks'. These make evaluation by objective norms as duration 
of success or degree of failure non-sufficient (Bercovitch, 1997: 148). Others, like 
Underdal (1992), have emphasised that negotiating, and mediating negotiations also 
requires some training as an active practitioner (Underdal, 1992: 252). Such qualities 
may also best be valuated through a case-based examination.
Hebert C. Kelman (1997), argues that: "A social-psychological analysis 
provides a special lens for viewing international relations in general and international 
conflict in particular…It may, therefore, help to explain certain phenomena for which 
other approaches cannot adequately account, or introduce dimensions that these 
approaches have not considered" (Kelman, 1997: 192).  His arguments for using 
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psychological analysis emphasise the need of addressing assumptions made about 
human behaviour scientifically:
"Psychological processes at the individual and collective levels constitute and mediate 
much of the behaviour of nations. Any general theory of international relations that fails 
to take cognizance of them is therefore incomplete. Indeed, political analysts and actors 
invariably make assumptions about such psychological processes- for example, when 
they talk about risk taking, decision making, intentions, reactions to threats and 
incentives, or the role of public opinion. What psychological analysis does is address 
such assumptions explicitly, critically, and systematically".
In his book on prejudice, Allport writes about the effect of contact as a 
means to reduce prejudice and group tensions. This work has been an inspiration 
for a large number of studies and researchers over the last fifty years, and a large 
base of knowledge has been inspired by his initial hypotheses. The contact 
hypothesis the way it was originally formulated states that: 
"Prejudice (unless deeply rooted in the character structure of the individual) may be 
reduced by equal status contact between majority and minority groups in the pursuit of 
common goals. The effect is greatly enhanced if this contact is sanctioned by institutional 
supports (i. e., by law, custom or local atmosphere), and if it is of a sort that leads to the 
perception of common interests and common humanity between members of the two 
groups."(Allport, 1954, 1958: 267)
The Middle East Program for Young Leaders (MEP) is a project involving 
contact between young leaders potentially influencing different levels of the 
Israeli/Palestinian society. The program explores new ways of building relationships 
based on a personal and individual commitment, and involving a common agenda, 
decided and agreed upon by all the parties involved. Reports from the participants, 
coordinators and facilitators show that the program has succeeded in building
relationships across boarders, transcending some of the obstacles normally 
experienced in efforts to break down prejudice.  
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This thesis is based on a critical analysis of the MEP. By this I hope that the 
program may give lessons for peace work that precede knowledge of the contact 
hypothesis originally purposed by Allport, moving beyond the mere contact approach.
Comprehensive knowledge of the mechanisms involved is, in my opinion, important 
for peace efforts on all levels of the affected societies.
As mentioned by the various authors, the differing facets of the process of 
mediation may best be evaluated through the study of a specific case. I hope that this 
study will bring contributions to the field of conflict resolution by its focus on 
facilitation and the dynamics and relationships of antagonists working together in a 
joint group. In the study I address the question of how relationships developed 
through different forms of activities, as leadership training and transformational 
leadership, affect changes in attitudes from attitudes of non-cooperation to attitudes of 
cooperation and empathy. I also compare the MEP to various theories in the field.
1.1.3 The Research Question
"How can experiences from the Middle East Program for Young Leaders (MEP) 
extend prior knowledge of 'the optimal contact strategy' in intractable conflict, and 
thus give basis for recommendations regarding conflict resolution?"
1. 1.4 Thesis Outline
In chapter two, the theories of attitudes and prejudice and the optimal contact strategy
are explained and the concepts are defined. There is also a presentation of the research 
design used for the analysis of the case.
The historical background of the conflict is presented in chapter three. The 
question of symmetry vs. asymmetry in conflicts is discussed together with an 
explanation of narratives and how these represents parts of the psychological 
dimension of the conflict. The importance of legitimizing the narrative of the ‘other’
is also discussed. 
Theoretical perspectives on international conflict resolution and peace building 
are presented in chapter four. This involves the different models of conflict 
transformation, and its implications for conflict resolution. It also involves theories of 
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third party mediation and intervention and Interactive Conflict Resolution, as 
proposed by Fisher (1997).
Chapter five is mainly a description of the MEP program. In this chapter the 
background of the program, the selection of participants and main strategies of the 
program are described.
 In chapter six the results from interviews of and reports made by participants 
and facilitators is discussed, drawing conclusions at the end of the chapter. 
In chapter seven the findings from the interviews are compared to the theories, 
drawing conclusions also of the validity of the study and the contributions of the 
MEP.
The general findings and lessons learned are presented in the overall 
conclusions.
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2 Theoretical Approach and Methods
In their book: "Designing Social Inquiry. Scientific Inferences in Qualitative 
Research", King, Keohane & Verba (1994) emphasise the way good qualitative and 
quantitative research derive from the same underlying logic of inferences, yet, come 
in different styles. Most research does not fit clearly into one category and "the best 
often combines features of each" (King et al., 1994: 4-5). Their definition of scientific 
research is according to them, an: "ideal to which any actual quantitative or 
qualitative research, even the most careful, is only an approximation"(Ibid: 7). 
Described by them: "Sometimes the goal may not even be descriptive inference but 
rather …the close observation of particular events or the summary of historical detail" 
(Ibid.). According to the authors such findings still meet the criterion of scientific 
research because they are prerequisites to explanation.
When doing a study of just one case, they emphasise the need for increasing the 
number of observations:
"If we want more observations in order to test the theory or hypothesis, we can 
obtain them in one of three ways: we can observe more units, make new and 
different measures of the same units, or do both, observe more units while using 
new measures" (King et al. 1994: 218).
In the study of the MEP I am trying to meet these standards. The study is meant 
to supplement recent theories on the contact hypothesis particularly in a setting or 
context of protracted/intractable conflict. The case is analyzed through the use of 
research done on attitudes and prejudice as well as conflict resolution and peace 
building in such conflicts. Attitudes and prejudice and the optimal contact strategy 
are explained in the first section of this chapter. In the second section intractable 
conflicts are defined and their conflict dynamics are accounted for. Why the MEP has 
been chosen as a case and the research- propositions and design are explained in the 
last section of the chapter, together with issues of reliability and validity.
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2.1 ATTITUDES AND PREJUDICE
2.1.1 Definitions 
In formal terms, an attitude is "a psychological tendency that is expressed by 
evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favour or disfavour" (Fiske et al.
1998: 269). An attitude is expressed by evaluative responses and the object a person 
directs these responses towards is termed the attitude object.  It is common to 
differentiate between the affective, behavioural and cognitive components of attitudes: 
affect, referring to how we feel in relation to the attitude object; behaviour, referring 
to how the attitude is reflected in our actions and cognition, referring to mechanisms 
such as thoughts, memories and rationalisations or the "set of beliefs about the 
attributes of the attitude object" (Bernstein et al. 1997: 579).  An attitude can be based 
on one, two or all of these components (Moghaddam, 1998: 101). 
Leon Festinger (1957:3) argues in his classical cognitive dissonance theory that 
people change their attitudes in order to make their thoughts, beliefs and actions 
consistent with one another. Research, though, has shown that people tend to change 
their attitudes in accordance with their actions even when there is no cognitive 
dissonance. Daryl Bem (1967), in his Self-Perception theory, argues that people look 
to their behaviour to see how they feel about an object. Elliot Aronson on the other 
hand, believes that inconsistency becomes important when some aspects of the self is 
involved, and has worked to identify the conditions under which cognitive dissonance 
occurs (Aronson, Elliot, 1992). He found that dissonance is more likely to occur when 
people are in danger of looking stupid or immoral, when they voluntarily agree to 
perform discrepant behaviour, when they are committed to perform the discrepant 
behaviour or when they feel responsible for aversive outcomes (Moghaddam, 1998: 
122). Arguing about the specific mechanisms involved, the differing theories seem to 
agree upon the fact that a change in reported attitudes is one strategy used by people 
to make them think better about themselves, and thus feel more comfortable. The 
findings support this notion. 
Stereotypes are by Bernstein et al. defined as "the perceptions, beliefs, and 
expectations a person has about members of some group" (Bernstein et al., 1997: 
583). The stereotypes usually involve the assumption that all members of a group 
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share the same characteristics, even when this is not the case. Stereotypes often lead to 
or accompany prejudice, which can be defined as “an attitude toward others solely on 
the basis of group membership” (Moghaddam, 1998: 330).  Prejudice is by many 
theorists seen to consist of the same components as attitudes. The stereotype is then 
the cognitive component; the emotive component is often comprised of hatred and 
anger; while the behavioural component may involve discrimination (Bernstein et al. 
1997: 584). As has been the case in many armed conflicts in recent as well as ancient 
history, violence against the other group even in the form of genocide has come to 
result of such prejudice. According to Dovidio and Gaertner (1999)  the negative 
feelings and believes that underline contemporary7 forms of prejudice are rooted in 
either individual processes such as cognitive and motivational biases and 
socialization, or intergroup processes such as realistic8 group conflict or biases 
associated with the mere categorization of people into in-groups and out-groups 
(Dovidio & Gartner, 1999: 101). In intractable conflicts such as the one in 
Israel/Palestine, peoples on both sides are in addition reacting to collective threat and 
fear (Pettigrew, 2003: 70). Pettigrew mentions different ways by which threat 
typically affects individuals, referring to findings done by various social psychological 
researchers. According to these: " threats diminishes cognitive capacity and increases 
the emotional influence… it gives greater reliance on group stereotypes…perceptions 
of the threatening out-group as extreme and homogenous…and heightened distrust, 
suspicion and prejudice." (Ibid.) According to Pettigrew, the individual effects of fear 
are exacerbated by collective threat, through the process of social support. As to say: 
Our responses must be true when everyone else feels the same. He believes that 
peoples reacting to strong levels of collective threat and fear often violate also their 
own deeply held values and principles (Ibid.).
Work by social scientist Gordon Allport (1958) and others, on the reduction of 
prejudice takes as its point of departure what is called the contact hypothesis.
7 Recent researchers have made distinctions between traditional, blatant, direct forms of prejudice, and more 
subtle and less conscious contemporary forms (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1999:101; Meertens & Pettigrew, 1997). 
Because of changing norms and legislative acts against discrimination, at least in western societies, overt 
expressions of prejudice have declined over the past 35 years. Contemporary forms however, continue to exist 
(Dovidio & Gaertner, 1999:101).
8 Conflict as it is defined in chapter one.
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Research has shown that intergroup relations can be improved if there is contact 
between individuals from antagonist groups and this contact;
1) Allows for equal status among participants,
2) provides opportunities for intimate relations among individuals,
3) includes institutional support, and  
4) involves cooperative rather than competitive interactions9 (Allport, 1954: 267).
Research indicates that this type of situations contains some critical elements that 
provides for a perception of the other as an individual rather than as one of them. The 
situation is likely to create a mismatch between existing images of the other group, 
and the individuals you meet or get in contact with. You start to recognize the 
heterogeneity of the other group, and this is the beginning of breaking down 
stereotypes and prejudice (Tal-Or, Bonninger & Bleicher, 2002: 101). These kinds of 
positive interactions that facilitate the perception of the out group as members of your 
own group, may eventually lead to the original distinction, but now in a more positive 
and differentiated context.
Generalization from perceptions of one out group member to the group as a 
whole may be enhanced by the condition of prolonged contact. As mentioned by 
Pettigrew (1997: 173) prolonged contact, that has a 'friendship potential' can also 
allow for the development of empathy towards the other group (Ibid).
Research based on the work by Gordon Allport is called the contact approach. 
After more than fifty years of research, based on this framework, authors are now
criticizing some of the research practices dominating this field. Dixon et al. (2005) 
argue that too much of the studies of interactions are occurring under rarefied 
conditions and that some of the findings 'gloss over' the 'harsher' realities of social life 
in cities experiencing high degrees of segregation. This is in spite of interventions to 
promote desegregation, guided by the contact approach (Dixon et al., 2005: 1). 
Although the authors recognize that the contact hypothesis "is one of the most 
successful ideas in the history of social psychology, and…contact researchers are right 
to claim that desegregation has a potential to reduce prejudice" (Ibid: 3), emphasis is 
made on the fact that the approach "offers little guidance about how this ideal is to be
9 This is "given a population of ordinary people, with a normal degree of prejudice"(Allport, 1954: 267). As to 
say, a situational variable cannot always overcome the personal variable regarding prejudices (Ibid.).
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achieved in places where racial segregation and inequality are deeply entrenched" 
(ibid: 2). 
2.1.2 'The Optimal Contact Strategy'
The optimal contact strategy "aims to identify and elucidate the conditions under 
which contact works most effectively to reduce prejudice and, by implication, to 
increase the possibility of social harmony" (Dixon et. al, 2005: 4). Prescriptions that in 
recent years have been recommended in the contact literature are that the contact 
should:
• be regular and frequent 
• involve a balanced ration of in-group to out-group members
• have genuine "acquaintance potential"
• occur across a variety of social settings and situations
• be free from competition
• be evaluated as "important" to the participants involved
• occur between individuals who share equality of status
• involve interaction with a counterstereotypic member of another group
• be organized around cooperation toward the achievement of a superordinate goal
• be normatively and institutionally sanctioned
• be free from anxiety or other negative emotions
• be personalized and involve genuine friendship formation and 
• be with a person who is deemed a typical representative member of another group 
(ibid: 5). 
Discussing limitations of this optimal contact strategy, Dixon et al. emphasise
the fact that scholars working in places such as Israel, Northern Ireland, South Africa 
and the United States have noted how "wider power structures – embedded within the 
historical, political, and economic organization of society- make conditions such as 
equality of status and cooperative interdependence either difficult to implement or 
applicable only within a narrow range of settings" (Ibid: 7). 
Pettigrew and others have emphasised that intergroup friendship has been a 
neglected point in the contact literature. He also argues that friendships across group 
lines have special importance for the generalization of contact effects to out-groups 
not involved in the contact. Pettigrew proposes that the earlier consensus by contact 
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theorists of cognitive barriers deterring the widespread generalization of contact 
effects, fails to look at the affective effects of intergroup friendships, possibly 
overriding these barriers (Pettigrew, 1997: 181). His study suggests that interpersonal 
closeness is an essential condition often not contained in contact situations, and that 
"..effective intergroup contact relates more closely to the study of long-term close 
friendships than to the initial acquaintanceship literature. Optimal intergroup contact 
requires time." (Ibid: 182).  
The MEP offers an opportunity to study the effects of intergroup contact in the 
context of deep seated or intractable conflict. The program is not originally built on or 
guided by research on the contact approach but includes all of the optimal conditions 
listed above, as well as other features that might play a role in developing friendship 
and constructive relationships. 
2.2 THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
Robert K. Yin (1994) heavily emphasises the difference between what he calls 
statistical generalization and analytic generalization (Yin, 1994: 36). When using e.g. 
surveys, researchers select a specific sample that is to be transferable to a larger 
universe. According to Yin this analogy of statistical generalization is irrelevant when 
we are dealing with case studies. In case studies one relies on analytical 
generalization where the researcher strives to generalize a particular set of results to a 
broader theory. Yin mentions five components that are specifically important in 
designing case studies: 
1) a study's questions, 
2) its propositions 
3) its unit(s) of analysis 
4) the logic linking the data to the propositions , and
5) the criteria for interpreting the findings (Ibid: 20). 
The research design for this study is explained in this section. The last point, though, 
is left for the discussion in chapter seven.
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2.2.1 Why Choose the MEP as a Case? 
According to the above mentioned theories, what the research on attitudes in violent 
conflicts is lacking is mainly three things:
1) Studies of programs in specific real life settings, 
2) An emphasis on long term efforts that by many has been pointed out as crucial for the 
development of longstanding relationships preferably taking the forms of close friendship, 
3) Thick descriptions of the process the people involved are going through, explaining them 
more in qualitative than quantitative terms.
As also pointed out by critics of the optimal contact approach, obstacles met in 
specific contexts of intractable conflicts like the one in Israel/Palestine are many. The 
political issues, the violence and atrocities and the narratives of hostile images 
negating the rights and virtues of the people on "the other side" constitute some of 
these obstacles. In addition there are the barriers of language and the differing 
traditions and histories of the peoples in the region. Some would argue that one can 
hardly speak of prejudice in a context where much of the anger and hatred is based on 
actual violence and injustices that are very real to the people involved in the conflict. 
Yet, the mechanisms are similar to the ones seen in much less violent contexts. As a 
result group polarization continues to make peace settlements as well as peace in a 
larger sense, as the secession from direct-, structural- and cultural violence, less likely.
All of the conditions mentioned by the optimal contact strategy are already 
parts of the MEP program. The MEP thus represents a unique opportunity to examine 
some of the mechanisms of the reduction of prejudice in these types of conflicts. The 
fact that the program is not built on contact literature or the specifications of the 
optimal contact strategy makes it even more realistic compared to other, more 
experimental studies of such processes.
The program has gone through a selection process choosing participants of 
different gender, occupation, nationalities, with relative equality of status within the 
group but also to a certain degree in their lives outside the group setting. In addition to
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involving 'a balanced ration of in-group to out-group members'10 as prescribed by the 
optimal contact strategy, the MEP-group involve Jordanians and Norwegians, adding 
to a less hostile and conflict prone atmosphere as reported by the facilitators of the 
program. The program is also based on a long-term or even life time commitment. 
A major advancement in the MEP is that friendships have evolved and 
continued to exist also outside the group setting when the participants return to their 
positions in society and to their home environments. This may be viewed as a great 
success in terms of developing cooperative patterns and prejudice reduction. If this 
positive development is to be replicated by other programs involved in such work, one 
has to examine the process the participants have been through. The important question 
to be raised is which of the processes of the program, if any, actually triggered this 
development.
2.2.2 The Research Question and its Propositions:
What I examine in this study is how former knowledge on the contact approach 
corresponds to knowledge in the specific contexts of intractable conflict. This can be 
gained through a closer examination of the MEP, based on the predictions from the 
optimal contact strategy. The first part of my research question is the following: 
"How can experiences from the Middle East Program for Young Leaders (MEP) extend prior 
knowledge of 'the optimal contact strategy' in intractable conflicts?"
This is a broad question, and needs to be narrowed down for research purposes. As I 
wanted to examine the processes of the MEP and to what extent these processes could 
account for changes in patterns of cooperation between the participants, I chose to 
focus on these specific processes in the thesis. This is emphasised in the following 
operationalization:
"How can processes of the MEP explain the emergence and maintenance of cooperative 
patterns within and between the program participants?"
10 In this case the ingroup and outgroup refers to Palestinians and Israelis as they form the antagonist groups in 
the conflict.
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By this I have chosen to focus on one particular aspect of the program, the one related 
to cooperation. In addition there is a focus on the continuation of such cooperative 
patterns, as to say I am also emphasising the long-term commitment of the program. 
In line with the contact –literature such long-term cooperative patterns may 
take the form of friendships. This is seen to be one of the prerequisites for changing 
deep-rooted prejudice, as to say, the change of viewing the other participants as an 
enemy or adversary to a friend or a 'fellow human being sharing a common vision' 
may be seen as one of its propositions. The view of the other participants and how 
these have changed while being a part of the MEP is also a main concern in the 
analysis. The hypothesis is that the contact under the conditions included in the MEP
will lead to friendship and cooperation, and thus give the participants a more 
differentiated view of the other participants hopefully leading to a more differentiated 
view of the larger groups that the participants represent in their home environments.
Even though the MEP can be labelled a contact approach, it is also a program 
of transformational leadership, trying to teach and continue to develop the leadership 
skills of its participants. At the same time it shares features with conflict resolution 
workshops emphasising the development of skills such as listening, ethics in conflicts, 
creativity and dialogue. It also uses a practice that the MEP facilitators call: 'learning 
by discovery through relationships'. Invited guests share their knowledge and 
experiences regarding certain management skills, just as the participants are able to 
share their experiences. These additional features of the program may be fruitful in 
ways not predicted by the contact approach.
In the last part of the research question;
"…and thus give basis for recommendations suited for conflict resolution in such 
conflicts?",
I am trying to incorporate this part of the study. Implicit in this part of the research 
question is the why, or why the processes used in the MEP should be considered in 
further conflict resolution work. To answer this, I compare the MEP to other theories 
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on conflict resolution. These are further discussed in chapter four. I also examine the 
context of the conflict, focusing on the sociopsychological aspects represented by the 
history of the region and the narratives and explanations of the participants from the 
various countries. This is to discuss the additional challenges in efforts to reduce 
prejudice and promote cooperation and reconciliation, faced in intractable conflicts.
2.2.3 Units of Analysis
I examine the MEP both as a group process and as individual processes in each of the 
participants. Every participant has an individual motivation for joining the program 
and also its individual gains, at the same time the focus on joint efforts in making 
changes in the Middle East is what brings them together. Great efforts are being made 
by the facilitators to strengthen the relationships and feelings of being a group that 
work together and keep in contact also in their everyday lives.  All of the participants, 
especially the ones from the conflicting populations, also bring along a strong feeling 
of belonging to a specific nation. In the analysis it is not possible to fully isolate these 
three levels of analysis. Yet, in the case study I will focus more on the individual level 
and the group level, and this is reflected in the interviews. The national level is 
discussed in the history chapter where also the narratives of the two peoples in the 
Israeli/Palestinian conflict are elaborated on. In terms of units of analysis, the MEP 
comprises the eleven participants11 selected for the first phases of the program and 
their experiences with the program from December 2003 until today. In the study the 
experiences of these participants are the dependent variable. The program, comprising 
also of the Abildso team and its coordinators, arranging all the gatherings and making 
it the program that it is today constitute the independent variable. 
2.2.4 Linking the Data to the Propositions
The case study of the MEP relies on four types of sources:
1) Written documents, constituting reports from the gatherings written by the 
facilitators and also including comments by coordinators and the participants 
themselves, applications for funding to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
11 Two of these later withdrew from the program, and have been given little emphasis in the study.
26
Affairs, e-mails written by the facilitators, notes form lectures and workshops 
etc.
2) My own interviews of five of the participants and one of the Norwegian 
facilitators. 
3) A short documentary of the MEP, resulting from a film project organized by 
the participants themselves where some of them are interviewed about their 
experiences with the program, and
4) a questionnaire sent to all the participants regarding the specific theme of my 
thesis. 
The questionnaire consisted of only few questions and encouraged the participants to 
write about their experiences of how the relationships to the other participants have 
changed, more or less in the form of writing an essay. They have also been asked to 
focus on particular experiences leading to the specific changes, if there were any12.
As I already new that friendships had been formed during the processes of the 
program, after speaking with the program facilitators, the questions were meant to 
double-check these assumptions, as well as examine how the participant themselves 
regarded these friendships and specific changes. The documentary added to this 
information and gave me an opportunity to see the people I was interviewing, mostly 
by phone, in the program setting.
Because much research is already done on the contact approach and 
experiences leading to the reduction of prejudice, inferences could be drawn through 
the comparison of the program to the specific recommendations of the optimal contact 
strategy, and also through comparisons to similar projects in the region. Through the 
interviews I wanted to get a better view of the processes of the program, the ideas and 
thoughts guiding the actions of the facilitators, obstacles met, how these were 
responded to and also how the participants functioned as a group. The questionnaire 
was only meant to add to these data, as some people feel more comfortable explaining 
themselves in writing. The questionnaire would also give the participants the chance 
to think things over before they were asked to give their answers.
Because most of the interviews had to be done by phone I gave priority to some 
of the participants over the others. I decided to prioritize interviews with two of the 
12 As none of the participants responded to the questionnaire, as commented in later chapters, the questionnaire
is not included in the appendix. 
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Israeli participants and two of the Palestinians as these represented the two antagonist 
groups. As an important part of the program was to include participants from various 
environments and political backgrounds, I chose participants that reflected this variety 
also for the interviews. In addition, one of the Jordanians was interviewed. Three 
women were interviewed, one from each of the Middle East countries, and two males.
Due to the extensive amount of material that came from these interviews, and the 
qualitative and quite exploratory approach I have chosen for the study I decided to 
focus on these five interviews for the analysis rather than interview the rest of the 
participants. This would give me more space for an in depth account of the responses 
given. All of the eleven participants were given the chance to respond to the 
questionnaire. The interview guide for the interviews of the participants can be found 
in the appendix. All interviews were recorded, with the consent of the interviewees.
2.2.5 The Validity and the Reliability of the Study 
As this study is exploratory and trying to give a thicker description of contact 
processes based on a quite small group of people, the problems of generalizability are
of course many. The personality of the participants may without doubt be seen as a 
major contribution to its continued success. They were handpicked for the program, 
and much emphasis was put on their commitment to the program and their abilities of 
cooperation. Experiences made by the participants prior to or outside the program may 
also be important in this regard. Even though the study can not be generalized to all 
kinds of group constellations, the selection of participants can, in my view, be 
regarded as an interesting part of the analysis in itself. As also mentioned by Allport 
in his original theory on the contact hypothesis, some personalities have higher levels 
of prejudice that do not easily change. For changes in early phases of a peace process 
a focus on people that are relatively 'open minded' may be necessary. By this the case 
offers a way to examine a path giving positive outcomes. This is important in these 
types of conflicts. The difference between people that are 'open minded' and people 
that are not is something that I will not be able to examine in this case, I can only 
account for the different criteria used when selecting the participants, and some of the 
background that made them choose to apply for the program in the first place. Yet, as 
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shown in the interviews presented in chapter six, the participants, based on their 
experiences in the MEP, have been through a process of change. This may add to the 
pragmatic validity13of the study. 
In the analysis I rely on the verbal and written explanations of people, all 
involved in the MEP program, as to say, much of the data is quite subjective in nature. 
Yet, the reliability of the varying sorts of measures I use can be evaluated in terms of 
the consistency between them. I have also tried to ask the same questions in different 
ways, through different measures, hopefully adding to the reliability of the findings. 
The validity of the study can be evaluated through its ability to add something to, 
explain parts of or be explained by parts of relevant theories. In the analysis I compare 
the study to the various theories discussed in this chapter and chapter three and four. 
Sarbin (1986) refers to narratives as "The Storied Nature of Human Conduct", 
and has proposed the study of narratives to complement more traditional 
psychological experiments that have been used in analyzing human personality. In 
line with his work, Singer and Salovey (1993) propose linkages between: "memory, 
goals, emotion, self-regulation, narrative, and the processes that connect them" 
(Singer & Salovey, 1993: 3). They focus on what they call self-defining moments or "a 
persons unique set of personal memories" (Ibid: 4) and how this affects an individuals 
personality. The emergence of a narrative psychology is seen as a consequence of the 
acknowledgment of the limitations of positivism, focusing on observable events that 
can readily be quantified and measured objectively. More phenomenological 
explanations, focusing on the way humans construe meaning out of their lives and 
experiences, are best understood through written or verbal narratives portrayed by 
individuals or through collective narratives that are not as easy to capture. Social 
sciences in general have been criticised for the neglect of these phenomenological 
explanations during the last twenty years (Ibid: 2). Studies of narratives are also used 
in sciences such as sociology and history. Thus, they may open for possibilities of 
dialogue between the differing fields of research. This may contribute to limiting the 
gap of knowledge about people living under extreme conditions as experienced in 
13 Pragmatic validity is, according to e.g. Steinar Kvale (1989), ’to make true’. Truth is what helps us to act in a 
way that contributes to reaching desired outcomes (Kvale, 1997: 86).
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regions of intractable conflicts. In chapter three, the context of the conflict and the 
national levels of the analysis are discussed through the use of historical accounts of 
the conflict and accounts of the different collective narratives of the Israeli Jews and 
the Palestinians. I try through this discussion to reflect on the way these narratives 
affect the realities of the peoples involved in the conflict, and how these may serve as 
obstacles or peacebuilding. As mentioned by Salomon (2004) they may also play a 
central role in facilitating coexistence (Salomon, 2004: 273).
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3 Historical Backgrounds and the Narrative Perspective
"Although every nationalist movement and creed asserts its uniqueness, all are in 
fact comparable. All share a common set of assumptions about the proper ordering 
of human society. All nationalists believe humanity is naturally divided into 
smaller units, or nations. All nationalists believe the nations can be identified by 
certain characteristics that all its citizens hold common. These characteristics 
include the linguistic, ethnic, religious, or historical traditions that make a nation 
distinctive. All nationalists believe that times might change but nations retain their 
essential characteristics…All nationalists believe that peoples have a special 
relationship to some particular piece of real estate in which their ancestors first 
emerged as a distinct group and flourished…All nationalists believe that nations 
possess something called 'common interest', and it is the role of the state to 
promote it. Indeed, all believe that the only form of government that can assure the 
common interest of the nation is self-government….In the modern world, these 
assumptions need no explanation or justification. They just are. And the very fact 
that they appear obvious and commonsensical means that nationalism, when used 
in its most general sense, might be called an 'ideology' "(Gelvin, 2005: 198).
Recent Map of the Israel, the Palestinian territories and the Surrounding Region
Source: University of Texas Libraries, 2006.
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The state of Israel comprises almost 80 per cent of what can be labelled historic 
Palestine14. Israel's population is about 6, 5 million, and approximately 3, 5 million 
Palestinians live in the occupied territories15. The total number of Palestinians, living 
also outside these territories, is estimated to be around nine million (Gelvin, 2005: 
206). The resiliency of the ideology of nationalism, as mentioned in the quote above, 
is not representative for nationalist movements as such. These come and go, and most 
historians believe that the movements come and go more as results of coincidences 
and surrounding realities than as results of a 'true' or 'false' nation identity (Ibid: 198).
In my account of the historical background of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict I 
focus on events that are important in the narratives of the two sides. Many authors 
have pointed to the fact that these narratives serve to fuel the hostility towards the 
other side, and this will be discussed in the second section. Not being an historian 
myself, I have chosen to focus on works by experts on Middle East History. Because 
of the controversies regarding the different versions of the history in the region, I 
decided to use literature from experts originating from Israel and Palestine as well as 
historians from outside the region, acknowledging that finding a complete and 
accurate description may not yet be possible.
As the happenings around World War I have been important for the shaping of 
what can be labelled 'Modern Palestine', I start by giving a short description of these 
events.
3.1 THE HISTORY OF MODERN PALESTINE 
At the beginning of World War I the European states divided themselves into two 
alliances. Britain, France and Russia16 formed the Entente Powers and Germany, 
Austria and the Ottoman Empire, the Central Powers (Gelvin, 2005: 175-176). To be 
in position to claim parts of the Middle East in case of victory, the entente powers 
formed secret treaties stipulating some form of compensation for fighting their 
enemies (Ibid: 178). Some of these treaties ‘gave away’ the direct control over 
territories that were originally belonging to the Ottoman Empire and some countries 
14 Historic Palestine or The old Mandate Palestine included also the occupied territories.
15 The West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
16 And the United States after 1917.
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were also given the right to form protectorates or organise zones of indirect control. In 
addition, the countries committed themselves to establishing an ‘international zone’ in 
Jerusalem. This was done to make sure that Christian groups would not be in position 
to deny others access to the holy sites of the city. This was feared by the Orthodox 
Church in particular, which was looking to Russia for the protection of its interests 
(Ibid).
3.1.1 The Palestinian Mandate
The former Palestine was to be put under the control of no less than four different 
countries or foreign governments. 
1) According to the Sykes- Picot Agreement17, Palestine, being a part of Syria, was promised to 
France, 
2)  according to Russian readings of the same agreement, Palestine, being the territory 
surrounding Jerusalem, was to be under international control, 
3) according to Arab readings of the letters to Sharif Husayn18, Palestine was to be part of the 
Arab ‘state or states’,
4)  the Balfour Declaration19 gave support for a Jewish establishment in the same territories 
(Gelvin, 2005: 179).
When the Americans entered the war, President Woodrow Wilson went against 
all of this, announcing his basis for post-War Peace in Fourteen Points, two of them 
being the right of peoples to self-determination and an end to secret agreements.  
The League of Nations20 was established to provide a way for international disputes to
be resolved in a peaceful manner. Interrupted by World War II the peace making 
efforts of the League of Nations ended in establishing a mandate system. The previous 
colonial powers were to ‘ensure the sacred trust of civilizations… not yet able to stand 
17 Agreement made between the British and the French, May 1916, dividing the Arab Middle East between them 
into two spheres of influence and into new political entities (Pappe, 2004: 66)
18 The British promised Arabian warlord Sharif Husayn the right to establish an ambiguously defined Arab state 
in the predominantly Arab territories of the Ottoman Empire. This was to be in exchange for convincing his son, 
Amir Faysal, to launch a revolt against the Ottoman Empire (Gelvin, 2005: 178).
19 The Balfour Declaration of November 1917 endorsed the Zionist goal of: “establishing a ‘national home’ in 
Palestine for Jews around the world” (Ibid.).
20 Formed by the entente powers, the USA, Germany and the newly established Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics were not initial members.
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by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world’ (Ibid: 180). The 
European mandatory powers had absolute rights over both the economical and 
political affairs of their mandates. According to Gelvin, the states now known as 
Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan and Iraq had never before existed and were actually 
created by this mandate system. France got the mandate for the territory now 
including Syria and Lebanon. Britain got the mandate for the territory now including 
Israel, the occupied territories, Jordan and Iraq (Ibid: 181).
3.1.2 The Zionist Movement and Jewish Immigration to Palestine
Around the nineteenth century intellectuals began using the term 'arab to refer to their 
linguistic and cultural community. Nationalist descendents used the term for their own 
purposes (Gelvin, 2005: 202). Some historians trace the origin of Arab nationalism to 
attempts made by the Turks to 'turkify' the Ottoman Empire in the early twentieth 
century. This is one of many examples of a nationalist movement 'inventing' a nation 
(Ibid). 
Arab nationalism was just one of many nationalist movements that emerged in 
the Middle East. Arab nationalism as well as a more regional nationalism, though, 
both lost their influence because of the mandate system, yet, nationalisms as 
associated with established states have taken hold. The Zionist movement was typical 
of nationalist movements that arose in Europe during the nineteenth century.  This 
movement asserts the right of the Jewish nation to an independent existence in its 
historic homeland. (Ibid: 206-207). 
Theodor Herzl (1890-1904) has been one of the most important persons in the 
history of Zionism. He meant that the Jews needed a homeland where they formed the 
majority of citizens and could escape the anti-Semitism experienced in many 
countries. Palestine was remembered by Jews living all over the world, as the place 
where Jews were exiled from by the Romans in the first century. Herzl organized the 
First Zionist Congress in Basel, Switzerland in 1897. It issued the Basel Program 
which called for the establishment of a 'Jewish home' in Palestine. The Program 
stipulated that Zionists should commit themselves to obtaining this through 
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diplomacy. The first real success of the Basel Program was the Balfour Declaration 
(Gelvin, 2005: 207-208). 
The British, after receiving the mandate for Palestine, allowed Zionist 
immigration to Palestine. The immigration began before the Balfour Declaration and 
continued after the war. It took place in waves. The Jews emigrating to Palestine from 
Europe in 1904-1914 and 1918-1923 formed many of the institutions and ideals that 
still exists in Israel (Ibid:208-209). According to Gelvin; "The belief that the Jewish 
nation had to purge itself of the ill effects of centuries of exile is called ' the negation 
of exile'." (Ibid: 209).
Even though indigenous Palestinian inhabitants resisted the Zionist Settlement 
policies in various ways as e.g. land occupations, violence against settlers and 
destruction of property, these were: "merely defensive, rather haphazard and without 
political goals. There was no Palestinian national movement until after World War 
I"21 (Ibid: 210).
The tension between the Zionist and the Palestinian community escalated during 
the late 1920s and 1930s. This was due to the spread of anti-Semitism in Europe that 
purged Jewish immigration to Palestine dramatically22. According to Gelvin; "By 
1931, Zionist land purchase had led to the ejection of approximately twenty thousand 
peasant families from their lands. Close to 30 percent of Palestinian farmers was 
landless and another 75 to 80 percent did not have enough land for subsistence"(Ibid: 
211). This resulted in an escalation of violence in 1936. This was called 'the Great 
Revolt' by the Palestinians. The British suppressed the revolt in urban areas. To put 
down revolts in the countryside the British employed tactics like collective 
punishment of villages; 'targeted killings' or assassinations; mass arrests, deportations 
and dynamiting of homes of suspected guerrillas and their sympathizers (Ibid:212). 
Gelvin sees this as the roots of the 1948 War, also called the nakba, or 'calamity' by 
Palestinians (Ibid).
21 Before World War I most educated Palestinian viewed themselves as Ottoman citizens. After the war some 
were attracted to Arab nationalism, other regarded themselves as Syrians (Gelvin, 2005: 210).
22 The Jewish population expanded from 17 to 31 percent of the total population in Palestine (Ibid: 211).
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3.1.3 The 1948 War23
The revisionist historians in Israel have challenged many of the official Israeli 
arguments of what really happened during the 1948 War. Others again, have tried 
counter arguing these propositions. According to Pappe; "Israelis -leaders and people 
alike- have a genuine psychological problem when faced with the refugee issue. This 
is indeed for them the 'original sin'…It puts a huge question mark over the Israeli 
self-image of moral superiority and human sensitivity" (Pappe, 1999: 58). The 
progress of dialogue and acknowledgment of the need of a peaceful solution between 
the Israelis and the Palestinians, particularly after the Oslo accords, have added to 
narrowing the gap between the two versions of the history regarding the Palestinian 
refugee problem, (Ibid: 37). 
According to the later revisionist, Benny Morris (2004), the violence in 
December 1947 started with Arab attacks against Jewish traffic after the UN general 
Assembly resolution of November 29th, 194724.  Following his discussion, the Arab 
exodus was triggered by constantly changing military and psychological realities on 
the ground in different sectors and "along the time-bar"(Morris, 2004: 70). These 
realities were determined by changes in strategy and tactics of the Haganah25 that 
again were responses to Arab strategy, tactics and responses (Ibid.).26
Morris writes that Zionist leaders came to realize that the Palestinians were not
ready for war and that their engagement remained largely disorganised and 
uncoordinated (Ibid: 86). HIS-AD27 officers reported that "…most of the public will
be willing to accept partition"(Ibid: 87). Others reported that: "the Arab population of 
the Galilee is unable to bear the great and prolonged effort [of war] because an 
absence of any internal organisation" (Ibid).
There were also reports of Arab villagers being afraid that they by surrendering 
and giving up arms to the Jews would be deemed as traitors by the Arab army if they 
23 This section is in part built on an earlier assignment that I wrote as a part of the course in 'Ethical- and 
political conflict in the Middle East and North Africa' , autumn, 2005.
24 This was endorsing the partition of Palestine into two states (Morris, 2004: 65)
25 The name of the main Jewish militia.
26 Psychologist Thomas F. Pettigrew (2003) argues that peoples under threat "rarely aggress upon one another 
without rationalizing their actions as reactive- either as revenge for prior aggression or as a pre-emptive strike" 
(Pettigrew, 2003: 77). The problem is that these rationalized aggressions leads to violence spirals (Ibid). 
27The Haganah Intelligence Service, Arab Department.
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reached their areas, and that their villages then would  be destroyed (Morris, 
2004:96). The Haganah, on the other hand, had problems trusting Arab approaches of 
truce and surrender, thinking that the moves might be merely tactical. They also 
argued that Haganah policy had to be determined on basis of national, not local 
considerations. These made it useless to agreeing to ceasefire in some areas while 
Arabs rejected peace where they, themselves "had the upper hand"(Ibid.).
An effort made in January to make truce in Haifa ended in advice by the Mufti 
to "remove the women and children from the danger areas in order to reduce the 
number of casualties" (Morris, 2004: 103). According to Morris a resolution adopted 
by the Political Committee of the Arab League, September 1947, recommended that 
the Arab states "open their gates to the absorption of, and care for, the babies, women 
and the old from among Palestine's Arabs- if events occur in Palestine that necessitate 
it"(Ibid.). This guideline, endorsed and adopted by the Arab Higher Committee
(AHC) and the National Committees and village leaders, contributed to fuelling a 
mass exodus (Ibid).
3.1.4 The Palestinian National Movement
These first attacks were not to be the last in the 1948 War. The review done by 
Morris elaborates on how deliberate Zionist policies lead to the blocking of the return 
of Palestinian refugees and that large parts of the Palestinian population were in fact 
expelled. Documents from the time of the War show reluctance by Jewish 
governmental offices in displaying their motives and justifications of their policies, 
yet, their effects, showed to be very real to the Palestinians.
After the creation of the Israeli state the society of what had been Mandate 
Palestine, now included the new settlers, the indigenous people living there, veteran 
Zionists, and close to one million of the indigenous Palestinian population had been
made refugees (Pappe, 2004: 142). The quality of life of the refugees in the camps 
was determined by the regimes under which they were living (Pappe, 2004: 143). By 
the late 1950s, this desperation lead to guerrilla activity and boys and also girls were
recruited from an early age. According to Pappe, this process was a part of the re-
emergence of the Palestinian national movement (Ibid: 148).
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The Palestinian national organizations started inventing a 'new tradition' 
involving ceremonies, rallies and days of celebration. This trend was embraced also
in Gaza by Palestinian members of the Muslim Brotherhood and the pan-Islamist 
movement founded in Egypt in 1928 (Ibid.) At the end of the 1950s, Palestinian 
activists had succeeded in formulating their two clear goals: the creation of a 
Palestinian state, and the return of Palestinian refugees. The state was to replace the 
state of Israel and would by this also realize much of the second goal (Pappe, 2004: 
151). 
The Israeli military regime was putting 160,000 Palestinians under their rule in 
October 1948. This regime lasted for 18 years. According to Pappe though; "the basic 
laws passed by the Knesset in the early 1950s served to reinforce a discriminatory 
situation that persists today" (Ibid: 153-160). According to him, three laws: the law of 
return, the naturalization law and the law of the Jewish National Fund were
deteriorating the situation for the Palestinian population. This was because the laws: 
"gave precedence to Jewish immigrants over indigenous Palestinians in 
almost every sphere….Palestinian land, which at the eve of the war 
amounted to about 4.6 million dunams [1 dunam = 1,000 m²] within the 
territory that became Israel, was reduced by 1950 to half a million dunams. 
By 2000, even though the Palestinian population had grown tenfold, the 
amount of land available to them remained almost unchanged" (Ibid: 160).
3.1.5 The War of 1967 and the Palestinian Uprising 
In June 1967 the Israelis organized a strike against the Arab world, leading to the 
occupation of the West Bank. According to Pappe, this was partly a result of the 
nationalist thinking of the 'redeemers' who regarded the West Bank as an important 
part of the Jewish state. At the end of the Six Day War, Israel also controlled the 
Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, and the Golan Heights (Ibid: 187-188). According to 
Pappe; "In 1972, 1.5 million refugees were registered, of whom 650,000 lived in 
thirteen camps in Palestine, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. The number of refugees 
would increase to about 2 million by 1982" (Ibid: 189). Jordan was the only country 
where there was no prohibition of land purchase and real estate transactions for the 
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Palestinians but even here most of the refugees lived under humiliating conditions 
(Pappe, 2004: 190). 
Experiencing the military rule united the Palestinians living in the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip, and the people living in camps in other Arab countries lost hope 
in the ability of the political leaders to change their situation. The PLO started 
recruiting the refugees in the camps for the liberation struggle. Candidates went 
through military training and nationalist education and graduates were rewarded with 
influential positions in the community. The resistance movement al-Muqawamma, 
revolted against the PLO's leadership and installed Yasser Arafat as its leader in 
1968. This allowed Fatah28 to tighten its control over the organization and restructure 
it after Leninist lines. After the 1967 War al- Muqawamma's focus became the 
liberation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Ibid: 191-193). 
Between 1967 an 1987, several terrorist attacks organized by the PLO were 
retaliated and 'revenged' by Israel. Using security issues as a main reason, additional 
efforts were made by Israel to expand their territories and domination in the region. 
This resulted also in two awful massacres in refugee camps in Lebanon. Judaization 
became an important part of the domestic politics of Israel. In 1975-76 the Housing 
ministry was waging a campaign where Jews were asked to settle in Galilee "in every 
possible way: new towns, new kibbutzim, new community centres" (Ibid: 227). 
Emergency regulations from the British Mandate were used to expropriate land 
without compensation or the right of protest.
The word intifada29 was used to describe the Palestinian uprising , starting in 
December 1987 as an attempt to end Israeli presence in the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip (Ibid:232).The PLO publicly announced their Declaration of Independence, 15 
November 1988 (Ibid: 241). The intidfada ended in 1991 after the Israeli army used 
an economic clampdown on villages as a last resort, cutting electricity and water.  
According to Pappe: "The Oslo document represented a meeting point between 
an Israeli wish to compromise territorially and a PLO willingness to begin peace 
negotiations with such a compromise- but by no means to conclude them" (Ibid: 242). 
28 One of the most significant Palestinian organizations, with Yasser Arafat as one of its centre figures, 
springing from the fida'iyyun (Palestinian fighters)  (Pappe, 2004: 149,322 )
29 Arab for 'shaking off' (Ibid: 232).
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The agreement took the form of a document called the Declaration of Principles 
(DoP) and was proclaimed on 13 September 1993 on the White House lawn. 
Following the agreement, three subjects were to be dealt with in future negotiations: 
the question of Jerusalem, the fate of the Palestinian refugees, and the problem of the 
Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. As pointed out by Pappe, this exposed 
the real nature of the conflict rather than a good solution that would end it. As the 
agreement in practice seemed to be very far from what was written in the document 
and actions continued  to reflect the reality of Israeli superiority in power, the Oslo 
agreement lost its image of a 'process of peace' around 1996. The tragic assassination 
of Rabin in 1995 was adding to this trend (Pappe, 2004: 243- 248). 
Most Palestinians saw the Oslo process as just another form of occupation and 
the Jewish community felt that it had failed on the personal security issues. In 
October 2000 the Palestinians were again taking military actions against Israel, after 
Sharon visited Muslim wholly places in Jerusalem. This time suicide bombing had 
become a preferred method for people wanting to oppose the occupation by force. 
According to Pappe, this was connected to the emergence and development of 
political Islam in Palestine, and should not be confused with a support on religious, 
legal or textual grounds (Ibid: 259-261). The political support for such political 
Islamist groups has continued to grow in the occupied territories, as showed also in 
the support for Hamas30 in the 2006 elections.
3.1.6 Asymmetries in Conflicts
Symmetric conflicts are conflicts of interests between relatively similar parties when it 
comes to power31 (Miall et. al. 2005: 21). When conflicts arise between more 
dissimilar parties such as a majority and a minority, or an established government and 
a group of rebels, they are labelled asymmetric conflicts. In these cases the very 
30 Hamas is an Islamic resistance movement, belonging to the brand of political Islam, and was founded by the 
leaders of the old Brotherhood on the first day of the first intfada. The old Brotherhood was a Palestinian branch 
of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, taking the hold over Palestinian politics on the West bank and the Gaza 
Strip between 1948 and 1967. Hamas, or the new Brotherhood, formed a military wing aimed at fighting the 
occupation alongside the PLO. According to Pappe, Hamas was one of the first political Islamist groups 
regarding the actions of suicide bombers as martyrdom (Ibid: 261-262).
31 I will not discuss the relative aspects of power in this thesis, but merely point to the fact that some parties are 
less dependent on the concessions of the other parties, as they may obtain their goals without cooperation. This 
gives them an advantage regarding their bargaining positions.
40
structure of the parties and the relationship between them may be parts of the roots of 
the conflict. Changing this structure may be necessary for resolving the conflict 
(Ibid.). In asymmetric conflicts the 'top dog' normally 'wins', but also asymmetric 
conflicts normally impose costs on both parties. Even in highly asymmetric conflicts 
the parties may reach a situation of mutually hurting stalemate. This is when both 
parties decide that they can not bare the costs of further conflict, and is usually the 
point when the conflict is ripe or the parties are ready for negotiations towards a 
settlement. Zartman and Rubin (2000) have studied the paradox of 'weak states' 
negotiating with 'strong states' when "by all counts they should loose" (Zartman & 
Rubin, 2000: 271). They have found that symmetric conflicts whether high or low in 
power often result in deadlocks (Ibid: 272-273). They have also found patterns in the 
way stronger parties in contrast to weaker parties form their negotiation strategies. 
"The party perceived as the stronger on the basis of undeniable power possessions- the 
United States, the European Community, India, and the entire developed 'North' –
adopted forms of a take-it-or-leave-it strategy towards its negotiating partner located 
on a spectrum of weakness" (Ibid:275). They also found that "Weaker parties respond 
not by acting submissively, but by adopting appropriate counter-strategies" (Ibid: 
277). The patterns showed that the weaker party increased their predicted effective 
power by making "a nuisance of themselves over issues that mattered much more to 
them than to the distracted and strong partner busy with other problems" (Ibid.) 
As emphasised in the report of Hilde Henriksen Waage (2004), the asymmetric 
relationship between the Israeli government and the PLO was one of the reasons why 
negotiations such as the Oslo talks have not yet led to peace in Israel/Palestine. It was 
also a problem that the Norwegian mediators did not manage to do their part in trying 
to level the parties and reach 'just' agreements satisfying both sides. As she mentions, 
levelling the conflict might not be possible without extensive efforts also by external 
actors such as the United States, as they contribute to the asymmetric relationship 
through their financial and political support (Waage, 2004). 
The effectiveness of negotiations is one issue regarding asymmetry in conflicts. 
The imbalance in power may make the road to a settlement shorter as both parties 
"adjust their behaviour to the relative power of the other side" (Zartman & Rubin, 
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2000: 284). Yet, what is seen in intractable conflicts in particular, is that the negotiated 
settlements often do not satisfy the weaker party, even when their governments have 
made an agreement. As for democracies in general, how to satisfy the minority that 
does not have the power to make majority decisions is a complicating issue. This is 
also a problem in articulating peace settlements. As within democracies, peace 
agreements made between the governments of two or more nations or communities will 
also have to go through the 'tests' of public opinion and satisfying the needs of the 
affected populations. This increases the necessity of representative agents engaging in 
such processes. 
3.2 TWO VERSIONS OF HISTORY
Historians have pointed out that the historiography of modern Palestine has inherent 
biases. This is due to the violent nature of the conflict, taking the form of a war, were 
documents and archives are deliberately being kept out of the public sphere, but it is 
also due to the asymmetric relationship between the Israeli and the Palestinian 
populations in  the region. Rashid Kahlidi (1997) emphasises the fact that most 
writing about modern Palestinian history has been done by non-Palestinians which 
have lacked: "an intimate familiarity with the indigenous sources, the individuals 
concerned, and the social and cultural context of Palestinian politics" (Kahlidi, 1997: 
90). Valuing cross-cultural approaches on the one hand, he emphasise the obvious 
need for a people to write their own history on the other (Ibid.).
This has for a long time been the argument also of Edward Said (2000), arguing 
for the rights of the Palestinian people.  According to him, national identity involves 
narratives of e.g. the nation's past and its founding fathers. He also points to the fact 
that "the art of memory for the modern world is both for historians as well as ordinary 
citizens and institutions,… something to be used, misused, exploited" (Said, 2000: 
179). The fact that the Palestinian history has not been recognized and that the 
Palestinians have never received any official acknowledgment of the injustices that 
was done to them in the aftermath of World War II is one of his main concerns. The 
story of Jewish independence and re-emergence after the Holocaust has been so 
strong that it has been: "impossible to ask the question: Liberation for whom?"(Ibid: 
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184). In the view of Said, the greatest battle the Palestinians have waged has been 
over the right to remember and possess a collective historical reality.
3.2.1 Narratives and Self- Defining Moments 
In line with the reasoning of Lederach and Galtung, Salomon (2002) emphasises that 
intractable conflicts are ongoing violent conflicts between actual adversaries that are 
"basically conflicts about tangible resources, accompanied and sustained by 
collectively held national, ethnic, tribal or religious narratives describing (the good) us
vs. (the bad) them," (Salomon, 2002: 6). The aspects of attitudes and cultural violence, 
as described by Galtung, are in my opinion best understood through the differing 
narratives of this specific conflict. 
Daniel Bar- Tal (2005) suggests a new conceptual framework that illuminates 
the psychological spheres of the society members involved in intractable conflicts. He 
assumes that although having its unique context and characteristics, each intractable 
conflict involves general psychological principles and dynamics that are similar, and 
knowledge of these mechanisms and dynamics will be important to make needed  
psychological changes in the process of peacemaking and peacebuilding (Bar-Tal, 
2005: 4-5). His framework emphasises the two-faced nature of collective narratives in 
intractable conflicts, as they serve to satisfy basic needs of the society members, 
enabling them to cope with stress and withstand the enemy, at the same time as they 
may 'close minds' and thus contribute to the continuation of conflict as well as serve 
as a barrier for resolving it (Ibid: 38). 
As emphasised also by Said, the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, in addition to its 
socio-political aspect, has the sociopsychological one (Fisher, 1997; Salomon, 2004; 
Lederach, 1997). Polkinghorne (1988), in his account of narrative knowing and 
human existence, point at how: "Narrative opens the experience of history and moves 
it beyond personal history to create a communal history" (Polkinghorne, 1988: 134). 
The sociopsychological reality is portrayed in a people's collective narratives and is 
reciprocally interrelated to the socio-political reality of a region. Polkinghorne argue 
that cultural traditions offer plot lines to us that can be used to make events into 
stories. He uses the words narrative schemes to describe schemes that organize 
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individual events using a framework including our purposes and desires depending on 
and restricted by our physical, cultural and personal environment (Ibid.). As to say, 
while collective identities influence political and social change, they are at the same 
time transformed in response to such changes, as they come to be parts of the political 
and social environment. Following this reasoning, narratives may serve to unite a 
people against perceived oppressive power structures, providing collective 
explanations and 'stories' regarding the perceived oppressors. This may again affect 
the way one decides to approach issues of conflict.
Rouhana and Bar-Tal (1998) emphasise how the clashing narratives of the 
Israeli/Palestinian conflict have some unique characteristics that makes the conflict 
very resistant to resolution. According to these narratives, both peoples perceive 
themselves as the inclusive indigenous people on the land; the Jews, by their historical 
and biblical heritage there, the Palestinians, being the ones inhabited there for 
thousands of years before the Jewish immigration on the eve of the 20th century. Both 
have a history of victimization, thus they both share a basic sense of lack of security 
and mistrust of the whole international community (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998: 763-
764). The authors also emphasise that there is a double asymmetry in perceived power 
in the conflict. The relations between Israel and the Palestinians is characterised by a 
perceived asymmetry in favour of Israel, while when regarding the power relations 
between Israel and the Arab world,  the Arab world surpass Israel in human and 
material resources and capability of enduring a defeat (Ibid: 764). According to the 
authors this is how power relations are perceived by many Israelis, and they 
emphasise that this double asymmetry generally has been overlooked in studies of 
conflict resolution and impact of intergroup perceptions. (Ibid: 764-765). 
According to Rouhana and Bar-Tal:
"Society members seek and process information in selective and biased ways because the 
stressful and threatening conditions cause increased motivation for closure, which leads 
to cognitive freezing. Under cognitive freezing, society members commit themselves to 
certain beliefs and refrain from critically challenging them" (Ibid: 766-767).
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This underlines the dual role of the collective narratives, being necessary tools 
for human survival when experiencing extreme animosities, yet at the same time 
fuelling hostilities by contributing to an often stereotyped view of the adversary.
3.2.2 Legitimizing the Collective Narrative of the 'Other'
Rouhana and Bar-Tal argue that for conflict resolution to happen in intractable 
conflicts like the one in Israel/Palestine there has to be profound changes of beliefs by 
leaders and negotiators, as well as by the society at large in order to support a 
negotiated agreement (Ibid: 767).  Salomon sees the mutual legitimization of the 
other's collective narrative as the most important goal of coexistence education in 
Israel/Palestine. To him, this means acknowledging the right of the other's narrative to 
exist and "accepting its validity on its own terms" (Salomon, 2004: 278). According to 
Salomon:
"When a community's collective narratives start becoming questioned and 'sacred cows' 
becomes candidates for slaughter, the monolithic grip of the collective narrative weakens 
and an examination of each side's actions can take place. It is, no doubt, a soul searching 
process: Although it does not pertain personally to the individuals involved in a 
coexistence program, it nevertheless, is an assault on their collective identity and pride" 
(Ibid: 279).
He argues that the process of legitimization must be gradual. First, this should take the 
form of gaining familiarity with the narratives of the other, e. g. through personal 
stories portrayed by someone representing the antagonist group. Ideally this will lead 
to the acknowledgment of the fears and suffering experienced by the 'others' and an 
acceptance of their right to feel humiliated, oppressed or discriminated against. The 
next step would be the acknowledgement of the history the way the people of the 
other side sees it, and again,  the acknowledgement of one's own role in the conflict 
(Ibid: 278-279). 
Regarding the question of asymmetry in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, 
Salomon argues that as the two sides in the conflict differ in their social class, 
political power, education, and also their legal and civil rights, it is also true that the 
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Jewish- Zionist narrative dominates, at least within the Israeli territories. Thus, it may 
not make sense to expect the Palestinians to accept the Jewish-Zionist narrative as 
legitimate, as this is already the dominating one. Yet, Salomon proposes that the 
Palestinians should be expected to come to accept the Israeli side's right to live 
securely (Ibid: 281).
As emphasised by Rouhana and Bar-Tal among others, it is extremely difficult 
to produce a vision of peace in societies "embroiled in intractable conflicts whose 
dynamics are not conducive to such vision" (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998: 768). Yet, 
they argue that some psychology based intervention methods can contribute to initial 
steps, such as changing beliefs necessary for engaging in a conflict resolution process 
and exploring narratives in small groups. They outline the references to several such 
methods or workshops in their article (Ibid: 768-769). Some of these will be 
considered in the analysis of the MEP in the remaining chapters of this thesis. The 
MEP approach though differs in its efforts in building relationships before focusing on 
political issues. Addressing political issues or leaving them out is a question of 
controversy in coexistence work. This is one of the aspects discussed in the following 
analysis. First, though, in the next chapter, theoretical perspectives on conflict 
resolution and peace building are discussed.
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4 Theoretical Perspectives on Peacebuilding &
International Conflict Resolution
Within the framework of peacebuilding and conflict resolution there is a need of 
clarifying concepts as the terminology used in this field of practice and research often 
is ambiguous and the concepts overlapping. In this chapter I account for theoretical 
perspectives I have used in the analysis of the MEP. 
4.1 CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION
4.1.1 Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding 
As shown by the conflict triangle and also other, more circular models of conflict 
dynamics, it is not always easy to define what comes first, the contradictions, 
behaviour or attitudes. Miall et al. proposes a circle of social change to illustrate 
conflict dynamics and conflict resolution (Figure 4.1). 
Figure 4.1 Conflict dynamics and conflict resolution
Source: Miall et al, 2005(23, figure 1.9)
In this model the 'life cycle' of conflict is seen as a progression from peaceful social 
change to conflict formation to violent conflict, then to conflict transformation and 
back to social change. The sequence can also go directly from conflict formation to 
transformation and back to social change, or from conflict formation to violent 
conflict and back to the creation of new conflicts. Transforming the conflict or 
questions of dispute from violent or suppressive actions into peaceful behaviour, is the 
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challenge of social actors in the affected society. This is also the subject of conflict 
resolution.
Conflict resolution implies that the deep-rooted sources of conflicts are 
addressed and transformed. This term refers both to the process of bringing about 
these changes and the completion of the process. In addition it refers to the work of 
practitioners both on the interpersonal level and between different constellations of 
groups. Still, the senses of the term seem to emerge, as many of the mechanisms 
involved are similar or the same (Miall et. al., 2005: 29). 
Miall et al. define peacemaking as a sense of "moving towards a settlement of 
armed conflict, where conflicting parties are included to reach agreement voluntarily" 
(Miall et al., 2005: 30). Peacekeeping refers to "the interposition of international 
armed forces to separate the armed forces of belligerents" (Ibid.). This concept is now 
often associated with monitoring and policing and supporting humanitarian 
intervention, but can also take the form of military interventions. Peace- enforcement
is defined as: "The imposition of a settlement by a powerful third party" (Ibid.). 
Contrasting theses varying concepts, peacebuilding is, according to the same authors, 
underpinning the "work of peacemaking and peacekeeping by addressing structural 
issues and the long-term relationships between conflictants" (Ibid.). Following the
definitions of Galtung, mentioned in the introductory chapter, peacebuilding, thus 
addresses issues of positive peace, while peacekeeping and peace-enforcement mainly 
address issues of negative peace. According to Ronald J. Fisher (1997), 
peacebuilding; “Combines the classical meaning of social development to reduce 
inequity with a new interactive element designed to improve the relationship and 
deescalate hostility between the parties.”(Fisher, 1997:168). 
The hourglass model of Miall et al. (Figure 4.2) illustrates the different phases 
of conflict escalation and the different concepts used within the framework of conflict 
resolution. The hourglass represents the narrowing of political space that characterizes 
conflict escalation, and the widening of political space, that characterizes conflict de-
escalation. Different conflict resolution responses become more or less appropriate as 
the space narrows and widens. By this model cultural and structural peacebuilding are 
parts of both the prevention of conflict, at the top of the hourglass and normalization 
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and reconciliation after a conflict settlement, at the bottom of the hourglass. Conflict 
settlement corresponds to 'elite peacemaking' or negotiations and mediation among the 
decision-making protagonists.
Figure 4.2 The hourglass model
Source: Miall et al. 2005 (12, figure 1.3)
Third party interventions have originally been seen as interventions by external 
actors, but there has been a shift towards appreciating efforts of also internal third 
parties (Miall et. al. 2005: 25). The role of third parties will be discussed in the next 
section, along with the different mechanism of conflict transformation.
Boutros- Boutros-Gahli, in Agenda for Peace, defines post-conflict peace-
building as "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and 
solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict" (Boutros-Boutros-Gahli, 1992: 
II: 21). As the discussion of the different concepts in relation to the escalation, 
transformation and de-escalation of conflict shows, there is no clear beginning or end 
of the conflict or the need for peacebuilding efforts. The focus of this thesis is on
peacebuilding through dialogue and building friendships between antagonists in the 
conflict. Because the need for peacebuilding efforts is rather constant in intractable 
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conflicts, the thesis accounts for such work in areas of intractable conflicts per se, and 
not in post-conflict areas as the definition of Boutros-Boutros-Gahli presumes.
4.1.2 Intervention by a Third Party
As indicated above, conflict resolution implies a transformation of the institutions and 
discourses that reproduce violence (Miall et. al. 2005: 29). "Where two parties are 
reacting to each others' actions, it is easy for a spiral of hostility and escalation to 
develop through positive feedback."(Miall et al. 2005: 18). This is one of the obstacles 
faced in intractable conflicts. According to Fisher’s model of third party consultation 
(TPC) the role of a third party is central or even essential in conflict analysis and 
resolution (Fisher, 1997: 142).
Third party interventions are usually done through the use of some kind of 
diplomacy, and it is common to distinguish between three tracks of diplomacy. Track I 
diplomacy involves official governmental or intergovernmental representatives. These 
can use good offices, mediation and sanctions or 'carrots and sticks' to force or press 
for a mutually accepted outcome. They can also work simply as facilitators making 
the actual rounds of talks possible. 
Track II diplomacy involves unofficial mediators who do not possess the means 
of carrots and sticks, but work with the parties encouraging them to find mutual 
agreements (Miall et al. 2005: 20-21). 
Track III diplomacy put emphasis on the importance of indigenous resources 
and local actors and involve also grassroots movements (Ibid: 25). 
The role of the third party, whether in track I, II or III diplomacy is to "assist 
with the transformation from what is an un-peaceful relationship, into one that is 
peaceful and dynamic" (Ibid: 21). As already mentioned, this is done by helping the 
parties to engage in and 'meet' in some form of communication or dialogue.  Though, 
in peacebuilding, dialogue is used in a different sense than its common use in non-
conflict areas.
The word dialogue comes from the Greek 'dia' meaning 'through' and 'logos' 
meaning 'the word', or 'the meaning of the word', thus the dialogue process may be 
seen as a stream of meaning that flows through and among the people involved 
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(Bohm, 1996: 6). According to Bohm, dialogue is not the same as discussion, or 
debate. These forms of conversation implicitly point toward a goal, tries to make an 
agreement, solve a problem or "make your particular point prevail" (Ibid: 7). 
According to Bohm: " In the dialogue group we are not going to decide what to do 
about anything….We must have an empty space where we are not obliged to do 
anything, nor to come to any conclusions.." (Ibid: 17). In the 'International Online 
Training Program On Intractable Conflict' (2006), it is also stated that dialogue is a 
process "in which parties engage in deep and meaningful conversations with their 
opponents, not for the purpose of resolving a dispute, but rather for developing a 
better understanding for the people 'on the other side'. Through dialogue, disputants 
break down negative stereotypes, focus on deep-rooted feelings, values, and needs, 
and come to understand the complexity of the conflict and the issues on all sides."
(International Training Program On Intractable Conflict, 2005: 7). Constructive 
dialogue between people from antagonist groups that possess a lot of hatred towards 
each other is difficult, and there is a need for a third party facilitating and supervising 
the way individuals respond to each others thoughts, arguments, feelings and ideas.
Fisher has developed a model of interactive engagement between parties in 
conflict, called Interactive Conflict Resolution (ICR). According to him, this method 
has great potential complementing other existing methods of conflict management, 
particularly in the de-escalating phase. It can thus, supplement traditional diplomatic 
activities (Fisher, 1997: 163). ICR is defined by Fisher as:
“..involving small-group, problem-solving discussions between unofficial 
representatives of identity groups or states engaged in destructive conflict that are 
facilitated by an impartial third party of social-scientist-practitioners. In a broader 
manner, ICR can be defined as facilitated face-to-face activities in communication, 
training, education, or consultation that promote collaborative conflict analysis and 
problem solving among parties engaged in protracted conflict in a manner that addresses 
basic human needs and promotes the building of peace, justice and equality.” (Ibid: 8). 
This approach is coming close to the one adopted by the MEP facilitators, yet it 
differs by its emphasis in the choice of facilitators and in the focus on basic human 
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needs and the more political issues of conflict, not addressed at the current stage of the 
MEP program.
4.1.3 Three Levels of Leadership
The MEP case is comprised of young leaders from Norway and the Middle East. The 
participants were selected for the program because of their potential as opinion leaders 
and 'agents of change'. Hopefully they will use their MEP network and relationships 
with people from the other side in the conflict to change the violent structure and 
culture of their societies. Lederach, has made a model of different levels of leadership 
based on the view that the affected population in a setting of internal armed conflict is 
represented by leaders and other actors, as well as the roles they play in dealing with 
the difficult situation (Lederach, 1997: 38). This is illustrated by a pyramid, where 
leadership is laid out in three major categories: top level, middle range and the 
grassroots (Figure 4.3). 
Level one comprises the key political, religious and military leaders in the 
conflict. These are leaders with high visibility in society. These leaders are usually 
locked into positions regarding the issues of the conflict. The leaders are also 
perceived to have the power of making decisions for and deliver the support of their 
respective constituencies (Ibid: 38-40). 
Figure 4.3 Lederach’s model of actors and approaches to peacebuilding
Source: Miall et al.2005 (24, figure 1.10)
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On the second level are persons who function in leadership positions but whose 
position is not necessarily connected to or controlled by the authority of the formal 
government or major opposition movements. Some of these are persons who are 
highly respected as individuals within certain occupations. Others may be leaders of 
important networks or groups connecting a certain region or community. The category 
of middle range leaders also comprise well known personalities belonging to a certain 
ethnic group or  e.g. prestigious poets and  Nobel Prize winners that are well known 
also outside their specific region.  The second level leaders may have influences 
reaching leaders at the top levels at the same time as they are not bound by the same 
political or military restrictions as the leaders at the top level, and they often have 
connections through networks across the human and physical geography of the 
conflict (Ibid: 42).
The grassroot level represents the base of the society. In protracted conflicts 
these may be involved in efforts such as finding food, water, shelter and safety. The 
leaders on this level are refugee camp leaders, health officials or members of 
indigenous nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Unlike many actors at the higher 
levels of the pyramid, these leaders experience the deep-rooted hatred and animosity 
on a daily basis. (Ibid: 43). 
The middle range approach to peacebuilding is based on "the idea that the 
middle range contains a set of leaders with a determinant location in the conflict who, 
if integrated properly, might provide the key to creating an infrastructure for achieving 
and sustaining peace" (Lederach, 1997: 46). Lederach mentions that a theory or 
literature of such an approach to peacebuilding has not yet been developed, but that 
there are other parallel approaches. According to Lederach, the middle range approach 
to peacebuilding, the way it is represented to day, fits into three categories: problem-
solving workshops, conflict resolution training, and the development of peace 
commissions (Lederach, 1997: 46?). 
Fisher, building also on the theories of Lederach, has made a schematic model 
of the potential transfer effects of interactive conflict resolution (Fig. 4.4). His model 
shows the potential transfer effects of ICR interventions on the policymaking and 
interaction of antagonists. In the model there are two parties. For each party, some 
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important actors in policymaking are identified, the leadership, the governmental 
bureaucracy, public-political constituencies, diplomatic representatives and unofficial 
diplomats involved in ICR or other unofficial interactions. The model is meant to 
encompass both highly organized and institutionalized entities such as states and 
structured collectivities such as insurgent groups (Fisher, 1997: 201).
Fig. 4.4 Potential transfer effects of Interactive Conflict Resolution.
Source: Fisher, 1997 (202, figure 9.1)
In the model, international politics refer to all kinds of government-to-
government exchanges. Intersocietal relations refer to all kinds of interactions 
between the public-political constituencies of the two parties. Unofficial interactions 
include ICR interventions with various unofficial yet influential participants (Ibid: 
203). According to Fisher, the least direct form of transfer would be through 
influentials or preinfluentials, connected to public-political constituencies in their 
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communities. These include e.g. young professionals, journalists, retired politicians, 
political activists, academics or NGO leaders which may have influence on public 
opinion in their communities and on various bodies that interface with policymaking 
through e.g. think tanks, political parties, research institutes or the media (Ibid.)
In a review of ICR interventions, Fisher (1997) reports that the number of 
published interventions has grown since the early 1980s making it possible to do a 
more substantial review and analysis of such efforts (Fisher, 1997: 187). His analysis 
covers interventions in intractable conflicts that: "..aspire to influence the relationships 
between the parties. Almost all deal with a two-party situation, even though some of 
the conflictants, such as the Middle East, involve multiple parties." (Ibid: 188). Most 
of them are workshops with durations ranging from two to fourteen days. Some were 
parts of an ongoing program of interventions. According to Fisher, there has also been 
a development toward continuity in the field, sometimes achieved by participants that 
have returned along with new delegates (Ibid: 191). As reported by Fisher, most of 
these workshops have only case studies to substantiate their effectiveness.  Only seven 
per cent used a form of post-assessment, and five percent used a before and after 
design. Control group designs were never implemented. The lack of pre-and post test 
assessments on such programs are according to Fisher hard to explain, as the 
procedures, relying mainly on interviews and questionnaires should be easy to 
produce (Ibid: 194). 
Table 7.1 Effects of 76 workshops from 1965-95, reviewed by Fisher
Source: Fisher, 1997 (table 9.4:196)
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As showed in table 7.1, 13 per cent show only increased understanding or 
improved attitudes of the participants. No negative effects are reported. 41 per cent 
have been reported to have had a beneficial influence on the peace process. 17 per 
cent had a direct influence through interventions, producing specific contributions 
used in the peace process. These were e.g. principles for settlement, plans for 
peacebuilding activities and initiatives to reduce tension. 26 per cent had direct effects 
on the diplomatic processes. Outcomes from category 3 and 4 are more concrete 
expressions of category 2, while both category 2, 3 and 4 subsume changes in 
category 1 (Ibid: 195-196). 
According to Fisher, results of his interviews show that most ICR practitioners 
are optimistic about the potential utility of the method, they believe that the methods 
is relevant to the international system as " a method that is valuable in its 
complementarity to existing practices such as negotiations and mediation" (Ibid: 198). 
Fisher also mentions that most of the interviewees:
"..have not experienced resistance from parties or potential participants, who tend to see 
the confidential, low risk, research-oriented venture as providing a unique and possibly 
useful forum for interaction. Rather, they have experienced resistance from other 
scholars, decision makers, or funders who regard the approach unrealistic, risky and 
perhaps dangerous". (Ibid).
The MEP program includes both problem solving workshops, and conflict 
resolution training, and has potential for addressing more emotionally related issues of 
hatred and remorse, generally done by peace commissions, on a later stage of the 
program. It also involves preinfluentials from the Israeli and Palestinian, as well as 
Jordanian community, giving the possibility of potential transfer effects on a large 
range of constituencies within their communities. The MEP as an ICR approach is 
discussed in chapter seven.
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5 The Middle East Program for Young Leaders (MEP)
The Middle East Program for Young Leaders is, according to its content descriptions, 
a leader training program "under the umbrella of peace and reconciliation" ('Across 
Norway': 4). The overall objective of the program is to: "empower young Palestinian, 
Israeli and Jordanian leaders with a united commitment to peace in order to create a 
sustainable movement that aims at removing the barriers of hostility amongst the 
different groups in the region." (MEP- Proposal, 2002: 11).
Timeline:
2001/2002 May-Oct 2003 Dec 2003 Feb 2004 April 2004 July 2004
Application Selection First gathering Second gathering Third gathering Fourth gathering
NMFA32+ process in the in Norway: in Norway: in Jordan: in Jerusalem
Consultating Middle East (ME) Trust building Trust building Core Values and 
People in the Ground Rules Ground Rules Vision of
Region , US & the program
Europe
Sept 2004 Dec 2004 April 2005 2006
Fifth gathering Sixth gathering Seventh gathering Ethics in Conflict Module
in Norway in Jordan in Norway completed
Listening skills Work on modules Making Documentary, Application for funding
Creative from Workshops, School Project, US State Department+ USAID
workshops, Participants Ethics in Conflict Module Application for 
Etc. Corner, first time more concrete funding of ethics in 
witthout MEP team conflict, Israel
Figure 5.1: MEP Timeline, from the initial phase and up to today.
The facilitators want the participants to discover leadership skills and visions of the 
future that "excites passion and commitment in and among the participants and in 
their sphere of influence" (Føyen, 2004 [e-mail]). A willingness to work long term in 
building strong commitment to each other is a precondition for entering the program, 
as it is meant to be a continuing process, recruiting new participants in the 
continuation. The building of relationships is done through leadership training, the 
32 The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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development of shared visions, common values and ground rules for the program as 
well as through practical initiatives and tasks (Føyen, 2004 [e-mail]). This chapter is 
based on written documents from the Abildso Cooperation and an interview with the 
MEP Program Manager, Asgeir Føyen, done at the Abildsø Farm June 2006.33 As 
most of the first section is based on this interview, only the use of other sources is 
cited. Most of the second section is based on an extensive MEP-Report of the two first
gatherings from 2004, made for the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the 
second section this report is only cited when using direct quotations.
5.1 THE BACKGROUND OF THE PROGRAM
The initiative for the MEP program was made by the Abildso Cooperation. This is an 
independent, non-profit foundation situated at the Abildsø Farm in Oslo, and has a 
mandate to: "inspire people locally, nationally and internationally to work for peace 
and reconciliation" (MEP- Report, 2004: 22). The Abildso team have long time 
experience from work in the Middle East and other conflict areas.
Asgeir Føyen, the program manager, is an engineer by profession, and has 
many year of international experience. Through experience, particularly from areas of 
conflict, he developed an interest of work regarding conflict related issues, and this 
interest was gradually turned in direction of the Middle East. He is now chairing the 
foundation situated at the protected farm at Abildsø in Oslo, Norway. The Abildso 
Cooperation was formally established in 2002. He has been engaged, though, in the 
Middle East since 1994. His experience regarding negotiations of natural resources 
such as water, between Israeli, Jordanian and Palestinian authorities, has been his 
most challenging experience through his career as an engineer and managing 
consultant.  In September 2000, during the second intifada, the peace process or Oslo 
process was officially over and this ended the use of much of the work he and his 
counterparts had been engaged in. Lots of investments made by a diversity of 
companies, governments and organisations seemed to have lost its importance, and 
much of the efforts seemed to have been done in vain. After a long process of thinking 
through how this experience as a negotiator and facilitating counterpart could be used 
33 The interview was done in Norwegian, as to say, the remarks referring to this interview are my own 
translations.
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in the future, he and his team decided that their relations to important people in the 
region were still very strong, and this could be a point of departure for a long term 
project focusing more on the relational aspect of people from the three countries. 
Their main observation, strengthening their belief in such an effort, was that the 
relationships, friendships, and trust which had developed over the last six years of 
work in the region, continued even when the projects failed. 
The problem with projects such as the water negotiations was that these were 
all contemporary. When the funding and projects disappeared the people disappeared. 
This was why the team wanted to focus on relations that were independent of any such 
project. They observed that political efforts, engagements and offices have their
limitations regarding such relational efforts because of their tight time schedules and 
the instability of governments in the region. People were coming in and out of 
governing offices in high speed. What was necessary in an area of such deep rooted 
conflict, was a stable, long term efforts that would continue regardless of who was in 
power in the certain period of time. According to Asgeir Føyen, there was a crying 
need for patience in such work. This would give people in the region the time and 
possibility to develop into devoted leaders or agents, with the means and possibilities 
to change their own future. 
Consulting different actors also in the region, he, together with the Abildso 
Cooperation, decided that engaging young leaders from the various countries would 
be the best approach. Leaders play a very important role in the management of such 
conflicts. They did not want to criticize the leaders of today, but rather identify young 
leaders of different backgrounds, representing the societies of the three countries, and 
showing the will and commitment towards such a program. Making a decision to 
commit to this program would not be easy for the potential participants because they 
are under a lot of pressure from their respective environments. 
5.2 RECRUITMENT AND OVERALL FRAMEWORK
The first phase of the program was supported by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, as well as the governments of Jordan, Israel and Palestine. Main objectives 
for this phase were to recruit up to three young leaders from each country and that 
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these participants in a long-term perspective would form a 'Steering group' for the 
continuation of the program. Initially this would be three Palestinians, three Israeli 
Jews, one Israeli Arab, three Jordanians and three Norwegians. The participants were 
to agree upon the main goals and overall framework for the MEP program, and decide 
what kind of skills that should form the basis for the training programs in the next 
phase.
5.2.1 Selection of Participants
A selection team of professionals with diverse experience was chosen for the process 
of selecting participants, guided by some key points that would be the basis for the 
identification of potential candidates. The team consisted of both members of the 
Abildso Cooperation and local Middle East advisors (Figure 5.2). But emphasis was 
made on the fact that the local advisors would be the once to identify who they 
thought would be the best leaders for their society (Føyen, 2006 [interview]). Formal 
education, achievements, professional competence was important in the process, yet it 
was secondary to the potential for leadership.
Figure 5.2 Organization Chart of the MEP
Source: MEP-Proposal, 2002 (12)
Middle East Program
• Young leaders 
(participants in the 
program) from the Region 
committed to MEP
MEP PA
National 
Coordinator
MEP Israel
National Coordinator 
MEP Jordan
National 
Coordinator
Steering Group
(RSG)
• 3-4 reps. from 
each party
Abildso 
Cooperation (AC)
• Facilitator
• Support 
(Mentor++)
MEP Xxxx
(Open to other countries 
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Projects and activities
National and Regional projects
Cooperation 
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The emphasis on leadership skills was due to the idea that people tend to live up to the 
expectations expressed by those they respect and trust. According to the basic ideas of 
the MEP program: "Potential leaders can be found, but great leadership must be 
formed"(MEP- Report, 2004: 22).They differentiate between leadership and 
management, and say that leadership is related to whom you are, together with your 
values, visions, motivation and influences, thus training of these skills can be complex 
and demanding. Management skills are easier achieved through training, but demand 
the extensive use of practice.
The selection of participants was to include people from the broader spectrum 
of society, from different professional backgrounds, with different experiences and 
from different political environments, yet they would have to be able to work well 
together towards common goals. The selection should also include both males and 
females in their early/mid twenties to early thirties, which had finished basic formal 
education as well as their military/national service. The participants were recruited as 
individuals and not as part of an organisation. Personal commitment was to be the 
basis for participating in the program, but their employer had to be supportive of the 
participation as well. According to Asgeir Føyen, recruiting the participants as 
individuals not representing institutions or organisations opened up for potential 
candidates that would not otherwise be allowed to join such a program. All 
participants also had to speak and write in English as the language of all MEP 
activities (Føyen, 2006 [interview]).  
The local advisors used their social networks and proposed ten candidates from 
each of the countries. These were interviewed by the Abildso team and the respective 
advisers in small groups, and participated in a small roundtable discussion with the 
other candidates from either side. After this, the best candidates were identified. The 
participants' character, valued by subjective measures of certain characteristics (List 
5.1), was important, as well as potentials for developing such characteristics through 
training.
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List 5.1: Selection Criteria Used for Selecting Participants:
1. Learnability ( open mindedness and self-awareness of limitations and potential)
2. Integrity  (Accountability, transparency-sharing weaknesses and strengths, honesty, 
loyalty, faithfulness)
3. Visionary ( ability to formulate and articulate goals, listen to deep values and dreams, 
openness to be directed by visions)
4. Value-driven (have a set of personal ethical building blocks, distinguishing right 
from wrong, that guides you in life)
5. Relation skills (willingness and abilities to establish strong relationships, 'true 
interest in others', non-judgmental and positive towards others, approachable)
6. Responsibility (determined, faithful to ones promise, willingness to take 
responsibility for oneself, in family, society)
7. Helpfulness/Serving attitude (show concern and empathy for others, humility in 
relation to others)
8. Patience (ability to wait for the right timing, being on alert, sound judgment)
9. Courage (willingness to take risks where outcomes are uncertain, willingness to 
make mistakes and learn from them, willingness to sacrifice and not give up, stand up 
for things that may not be popular)
10. Commitment (persistence, loyalty, stay firm and determined in difficult times)
11. Initiative ( willingness to make decisions, be procative)
12. Self-control (awareness of what is appropriate and inappropriate in different 
situations)
13. Self-motivation (does not need external motivation to be motivated, can be motivated 
in spite of difficult times/ personal struggles)
14. Respectfulness (respect for constitutions, law, authority or leaders, respect for other 
people's opinion, position, culture, gender, religious belief).
15. Teambuilder/-worker ( ability to share credit for success and failure, t inform, listen, 
share, help others, communicate and get people to work for common goals)
16. New Leader ( willingness to encourage others into leadership- especially the young)
17. Citizenship (loyal to the government under those authority you live and benefit from, 
focus on family, local community, nation, region, world)
18. Fairness/Justice (a wish to contribute to fairness and justness- equal treatment based 
on commonly accepted human rights, independent of faith, political, ethnical, social 
group, position)
19. Tolerance (open minded and acceptance for diversity)
Source: MEP- Report, 2004 (29-42).
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Openness t o change was the most important of the personality aspects. Asgeir 
Føyen commented that their experience lead them to believe that you could find 
people that would be open to change in every group, culture or organisation, 
regardless of the 'tone' of their environment or the social pressure in the group. Even 
when the policy of conforming to the group ideals is very strong, there will be people 
asking questions or wondering 'why is this so?' (Føyen, 2006 [interview]). According 
to him, the selection process has showed this to be true. Following is a list of the 
points the MEP Abildso team considered as part of the selection process. Based on 
these, and profile assessments of the interviewees generating personality style reports, 
the interviewers made their final choice.
Three Palestinians, three Israelis, three Norwegians and two Jordanians were 
chosen for the program. Some worked as parliamentary advisors, some as 
entrepreneurs, economists, health personal and some were master students. Among the 
eleven participants that were chosen for the initial phase there were four females and 
seven males. One Norwegian and one Palestinian later withdrew from the program.
5.2.2 Main Strategies
The goals of the MEP are to investigate main obstacles to peace, and how they may be 
broken down or removed. The objectives of the program are also to build strong and 
lasting relationships across borders and mentor for leadership committed to peace and 
initiate national or joint projects in different sectors. The leadership training includes 
areas such as teaching good governance, listening, democracy, justice /human rights, 
but the emphasis is put on "Learning by Discovery through Relationships (LDR)" 
(MEP-Report, 2004: 9; Føyen, 2004 [e-mail]). According to the philosophy of the 
program; "People learn best in the context of committed relationships"(ibid). The 
participants learn through experiencing and exploring relationships and an important 
part of what they learn is the things they discover through these relationships. The 
organisers believe that most of the knowledge of relationships and building 
relationships will be found in a small group, if one manages to create an open 
atmosphere. This knowledge can be expanded through research or written material on 
the subjects that is of some importance to the participants or facilitators, but it all 
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starts as exploration in the group (Føyen, 2006 [interview]). The participants work 
actively with selected topics in different group constellations and plenary discussions. 
By this, each subject is explored by the participants themselves.
According to Asgeir Føyen, it has also been absolutely necessary to do the 
process step by step and make efforts to 'feel' and 'listen' to all the parts of the group to 
get an understanding of what would be the possible  next step. Even though programs 
were arranged before the meetings it was not necessarily possible to follow the 
programs as planned. This was an important part of the process of moving on towards
the next step. Anger, misperceptions, or latent conflicts had to be brought up and 
discussed, either in the larger group or in conversations between individual 
participants and facilitators (Føyen, 2006 [interview]).
Eight main areas of discovery were being explored in the program meetings of 
phase one and continued into phase two. These are:
• transformational leadership, 
• life strategies and ethics, 
• interpersonal relationships,
•  political paradigms for peace and justice, 
• creative training and learning, teamwork, 
• crisis management and 
• conflict resolution. 
The participants are in general encouraged to focus on win-win solutions, with an 
open mind, and to investigate new ways of dealing with conflict together. In 
workshops, the participants worked together to construct a preferred vision for the 
future, receiving training also to become mature and balanced leaders. 
When the different areas of discovery were brought up, it was done through 
discussions with invited guests that had thoughts and experiences to share from the 
area. A "transformational leader", explained by the facilitators as a leader that has 
been in charge or taken the lead in a period of great change within his or her 
organisation or society, was invited to be the introductory speaker, sharing his/her life 
experiences regarding this topic. Extensive practice in the area of discovery was 
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regarded to be more important than e.g. a doctorate or extensive theoretical 
knowledge.
The involvement in the program is intensive in time. The first phase consisted 
of three trips, of approximately two weeks duration each, to Norway. In addition there 
were tasks and assignments to be done between the gatherings. The participants stayed 
in host families when they where in Norway. Prior to each gathering the Abildso team 
went to The Middle East to follow up participants, their employers and families, and 
also to keep good contact with and inform the Israeli-, Jordanian- and Palestinian 
authorities. In addition these trips gave the organizers an impression of the current 
atmosphere in the region. From 2003 and up to today there have been seven
gatherings; four in Norway, two in Jordan and one in Jerusalem (Figure 5.1). The 
Palestinian participants chose not to join the gathering in Israel.
5.2.3 Workshops and Contributions of the Participants
The MEP, through the first gatherings, agreed upon a set of ground rules that 
everyone had to follow in interactions:
• My perception may not be the only one or the right one
• Confidentiality about what each other share
• No interruptions. Facilitators are allowed to interrupt
• No accusation or name calling, violent speaking, shouting or personal attacks
• No political discussions or discussions on daily incidents/tragedies in the Middle East among 
participants
• Be on time
• Concerns should be shared immediately with Coordinators or other Abildso Staff (MEP-
report, 2004: 9)
They also agreed upon a joint vision and core values of the program (figure 5.3).
On the forth gathering the participants were divided into two mixed groups in 
workshops, aiming at formulating proposals for concrete projects that would support 
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the visions of the MEP. They decided on three ideas to be developed further, they are 
now all implemented or in the phase of being implemented34:
• Ethics in conflict. Developing a workshop module for 'ethics in conflicts', partly inspired by
Senior Researcher Henrik Syse, from the ethics program at the Peace Research Institute of 
Norway. The module is meant to be used by universities and other institutions in all the four 
participating countries.
• Nation wide Student Essay Contest in Norway. Theme: 'The Role of Norway in the 
Middle East.'
• Documentary Film. Making a MEP documentary. (This has been made through the help of 
film director Tina Davis (MEP- Creative Ideamaking Process, 2004)
The participants have also met and had discussions with various transformational 
leaders; the prior Norwegian minister of health, Ansgar Gabrielsen; former prime 
minister of Estonia, Mart Laar and the former Minister of Foreign Affairs and leader 
of the Jordanian delegation of the opening rounds of the Middle East Peace Talks in 
Madrid, Kamel Abu Jaber among many others.
Figure 5.3 The Vision and Core Values of the MEP 
Source: MEP fase 2, 2004 (1)
34 See also figure 5.1.
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In addition to the workshops, initiatives have been made by the participants to 
recruit new 'peers' for the program. These are friends, colleagues or other people from 
the community of the participants that have the desire to join the program in the 
future. Most of the participants from the Middle East have now 2-3 peers that they 
have introduced to the program values, rules and visions. There has not yet been a 
meeting introducing these peers to the other participants. 
In the workshops the Abildso team, consisting of four Norwegian, one 
American and one Canadian, all parts of the Abildso Cooperation worked as 
facilitators, performing the following tasks: 
• Chair all meetings (without voting rights)
• Give input, advice, and guidance as the process proceeds
• Give training to the young potential leaders
• Be available for confidential consultations
• Bridge relational gaps among the parties and individuals
• Assist in building confidence and trust among the parties
• Secretarial work (write minutes, reports, proposals, etc.)
• Professional advice/assistance (related to projects that will be carried out)
• Assisting in the training and recruiting of mentors
• Receive input from the advisory group
• Assist in fund-raising for the different initiatives (MEP- Proposal, 2002: 14)
After the second gathering the Abildso team suggested a joint history project to 
the participants where the participants were meant to write the history of the region 
together. Both the Jordanians and the Palestinians thought that it was too early in the 
process for these issues to be addressed.
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6 Findings from the Interviews
The interviews of the participants were mostly done by phone, limiting the time for in 
depth questions35. Yet, I experienced that they had heartfelt experiences they wanted 
to share. As they are all actively involved in matters concerning the conflict and work 
towards a more stable and predictable future in the Middle East, they were eager to 
talk about issues related to the program as well as general aspects of the situation in 
the Middle East. In this chapter I account for the main topics talked about in the 
interviews. Reduction of prejudice and relational aspects of the program was the main 
focus in the interviews. During the interviews, though, aspects related to conflict 
resolution in general and how the MEP approach is considered to be quite unique by 
the program participants was mentioned frequently. For this reason it became an issue 
also of my concern.
 I got the chance to meet one of the participants who was visiting Norway. This 
gave me an opportunity of collecting more vivid explanations of the gatherings, of the 
other participants and also to get a more extensive interview that has been very useful 
in the analysis. The short documentary also made it easier to visualize the people I 
was talking to on the phone.
The way the participants talked about their background, why they joined the 
program and their experiences in general was explained to me by extensive use of 
narratives. This only strengthened the assumption that a narrative approach is useful 
for these types of studies. To hide the identity of the various participants I only refer 
to the country they come from when quoting them. This is done because of the always 
changing conditions in the regions putting pressure also on the participants in their 
relations to their local environments.
None of the participants responded to the questionnaires36.
35 The phone interviews all lasted about thirty minutes.
36 The questionnaire and the selection of interviewees are accounted for in chapter two, section 2.2.3. 
68
6.1 THE ACCOUNTS OF THE PARTICIPANTS AND FACILITATORS:
6.1.1 How do Images Change? – Forming Long Lasting Friendships
The different participants all had their individual backgrounds and particular reasons 
for joining the MEP program. Some were brought up to think of the people on the 
opposite side, or the 'other side'37 as a differentiated group containing people they 
would label as 'good' as well as people they would label as 'bad'. Others were brought 
up to blame the 'other side' as a whole for all their sufferings. For some, the meetings 
with participants from the opposite side was very difficult, one of the Palestinian 
participants reported that her/his first time of shaking hands with one of the Israelis 
was as late as after the third gathering. Some experienced their first meeting with 
Israelis, Palestinians, Jordanians or Norwegians through the MEP. Others had friends 
or connections with representatives of the other groups also prior to the program. 
The forming of friendships with people from the 'other side' was seen by many 
as one of the program’s major contributions. For those who had no positive 
experiences with represents of the opposite side from the past, this was a major 
contribution also to changing their view of the participants from these groups. One of 
the Palestinians answered this on the question of why she/he chose to join the MEP:
"The MEP is a program that in that time when I joined it, it was a line of hope that 
we Palestinians look for, because it is a new way of dealing with issues that we 
deal with on a daily basis. Meeting the other side, which is not an easy thing to do, 
and it is not my favourite thing to do too, but, in a way it was a way to see how the 
other people, how the other side is thinking, how he acts, how he sees the 
world….This is one reason that I joined. The other reason is that it's a kind of 
competition with myself…..I was going to check if I fit or if I don't fit. And I think 
I fit…"
The same participant continued by saying that: 
"I think that I did not shake hands with the Israelis the three first times that we met in 
Norway, I think it was after the third or fourth time that just dealing with them a little bit, 
and I started dealing with them, and that is important for me, I started dealing with them 
not as Israelis, but as human people, because if I think about them as Israelis I don't think 
in fact that I can deal with them".
37 The opposite side and 'the other side' are used interchangeably and refer to the Israeli and the Palestinian 
participants. Israelis are at the opposite side to or the 'other side' to the Palestinians and vice versa.
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After asking her/him about what happened after the third gathering, 
resulting in this change, the participant answered:
"In the first three or four times I was not able to see them as any other thing, only as
Israelis, that they were killing us every single morning….. After three or four times, when 
you ….have your breakfast, do some skating or ice fishing or climbing or playing football 
or whatever. You start dealing with a guy that has two arms, two legs and a head like 
you. And this is what makes the difference a little bit, but on the political level it is a 
different story.."
Even the participants that started out with more differentiated views reported changes 
in how they viewed parts of the antagonist groups that they had put in the category of 
'bad people ' or 'terrorists'. One of them, a Palestinian, explained her/his background 
like this:
"My family was very very supportive, educating me and my brothers of how to live 
peacefully, how to seek other people and counter conflicts in a very peaceful way. So I 
was raised as a peaceful person myself. Even my contributions in the last and the present 
intifada were peaceful contributions. I would either contribute with medical help and 
support or educating other children when our schools were closed……..as a family we 
had Israeli friends…we had Palestine Israeli friends and Israeli Jew friends..I was brought 
up in a way to see the positive side of a person and never judge on appearance or a 
religion. I remember my father always saying to me: it is not a Jew Palestinian problem 
it's an Israeli Palestinian problem, so it had nothing to do with religion. So I learnt as I 
grew up that I …..have a problem with the politics, with the general politics, but not with 
the people themselves."
She/he continued by explaining why the MEP still contributed to a change in her/his 
views of the 'others':
"…I can see Extremist Israelis become friends of mine for example like [X]….[X] is an 
extremist person, and I have learned that such an extremist person, [she/he] and I can 
have a dialogue. [She/he] and I can have something to share, something to talk about, 
laugh together, maybe cry together, so it is, I have learnt that it's not only the good 
Israelis whom I should mingle and talk and be friends with, but it's also the extremist 
Israelis who have very extreme ideas about Palestinians or the Israeli/Palestinian 
conflict…"
Another participant, from the Israeli side also emphasised the importance of 
including the broader sphere of the various societies in the program:
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"About what the MEP can change, it can change and spread a lot around the world - as 
the peer groups will be developed, and they would have their own peer groups and the 
structure would continue to grow and grow, and people would know each other on a 
personal basis. I think that it would help. And I think that if we would start a movement, I 
think it would be wonderful. Now, the problem is that in Israel it could be a very left 
wing movement, and I think that the idea is to make it something very wide. That not 
only left wingers would join it but also right wingers, and religious people and seculars 
and new immigrants and everyone, everyone that could be a part of the Israeli population  
should join this. And it is not easy, 'cause Israel is very stereotyped."
The same participant explained her /his background:
"The Palestinians, well I grew up hating them mostly…..not only by my family, but also 
by my youth group. Everything where I grew up, my growing up environment was very
based on the knowledge that this is how it is, the Palestinians are to be blamed for 
everything we are going through in the past two intifadas, and that we are the good guys 
and they are the bad guys…we knew somehow, and we put it in the back of our minds,
that we knew that there were good Palestinians. Not every Palestinian is a terrorist.  we
also knew that innocent people were getting killed in this war, but we thought that, well,
this is a war and there are casualties in a war.…. It is a part of war and it is their fault 
because they are fighting from within the civilian territories".
About how the MEP had contributed to the change in her/his views, the same 
participant continued:
"X and I contacted very fast. And the connection became very good from the beginning. 
It was something very special, something that I really can not describe…I got to know 
them and… in general I learnt that there is another side. And that they are not the only 
ones to blame. Every conflict has two sides. Maybe some are more to blame than the 
other, but we really, we can not say that all the blame is on the Palestinians. There are 
some agreements that Israelis like to ignore.. And there are civilians that are getting killed 
and it is not ok and we should do more to prevent that. In general it has changed my view 
very much, more than I can say that... Now I can say that I can feel the other side, and 
I think that that is the biggest change of all."
The other Palestinian also emphasised the change in her/his view of the Israeli 
being a settler at the time:
"One of the participants used to be a settler, used to be. And I think that was the hardest 
thing to work with, but [X] isn't any more, and you know: Such a program, there is 
hundreds of programs in Palestine in a way like the MEP, but the quality of people 
supporting us, the ministry of planning has been supporting us, the president was 
71
supporting us. When you have all this support you start not thinking of the participants 
and if they are as you think or not. At the end of the day they are human beings like us. If 
I let my mind dream, I dream of them like monsters and killers and everything, but when 
you meet them, they area normal human beings."
The participants were asked about their relationship with the other participants 
between the gatherings, whether or not they have regular contact with them and if 
they consider any of the other participants as their friends. Most of them were very 
clear on the fact that all the people in the program had become very important to 
them. One of the participants phrased it like this: 
"Yeah, we meet each other, we check on each other, of course I miss them. They are a 
part of my life now, my daily show, whenever I remember my family, my friends. They 
are my extended friends. They are in the circle of people that I care a bout, think about 
and worry about. I wonder if they are ok, what is going on in their life, and we actually 
have updates between us, we send each other updating e-mails. "I got a new job" for 
example …I am a Palestinian and I got married in Jordan, and I insisted on the Israelis to 
attend my wedding, because they are a part of my friends and I  would like to share my 
wedding or such a moment with my friends, the people I care about. They were invited 
and I wanted them to be there with out no doubt….I wanted to share the moment with 
them, because they are a part of my present life…hopefully they will be a part of my 
future life…..They ARE my friends, yes. They are not my enemies…"
Another, from the Palestinian side found that the friendship concept was hard to 
use in her/his situation:
"There are many definitions for the word friend. I don't want to say that they are not my 
friends. And I don't want the same time to say that they are my friends. I just want to put 
a hundred lines under the words I said, that it is very different in Norway, from how it is 
at home. ….You go with a taxi driver, he speaks of these issues. You are sitting with 
friends in a restaurant or a coffee shop, they are speaking about this. So, that is not easy, 
for us to consider these people as our friends. I can consider them as colleagues working 
for different future for different thing, I can consider them. An important point, for me, is 
that you should know that me….like all Palestinians, am fighting for my rights and 
everything I do in the morning…"
When asked about how often the participants talk to each other between the 
gatherings, one of the Israeli participants said:
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"Some participants talk often and others less often, but it depends more on the personal 
relationship than nationality. The Israeli group have a very good contact, even if we have 
very different views and are at very different places in life. We do not live close to one 
another, but we talk to each other once or twice a week. When it comes to the other 
participants it depends on the feeling in time. Usually it is with a phone call and Skype. 
….I have a very good relationship with one of the Palestinians. We speak more often than 
the others, because we have a similar position in life."
I asked whether they sometimes even meet, and she/he answered:
"With the Palestinians it is almost impossible. But one of the participants came to visit 
me. We are not allowed to go to the Palestinian territory, and they need special 
permission to come to Israel. When we started, we decided that we are not going to work 
against the system. We are not against the government, so if they say we can not do 
something, we will not do it for now. We do not want to fight the law or something. So 
there are natural limitations to what we can do…"
Another from the Israeli side stresses how important it is that they sometimes meet:
"Right now it is very hard to see that is has a future. I know that it is in every one's hearts 
but as long as we do not meet each other it is useless. It is very hard to maintain a 
program without meeting at least once a year."
As the remarks made by the participants show, the MEP has offered a 
possibility for them to meet 'the other side' and get to know people that for them 
represent something unknown, and someone they have grown up, learning not to 
trust. This has given them the opportunity of 'feeling the other side'. Relations 
have grown into friendships were participants that would normally appear in the 
outgroup representing the 'other side' or even the enemy, have now become parts 
of their ingroup or the people they think and care about in their everyday lives.
At the same time, the program is recruiting people from the broader sphere of the 
various countries. This gives the participants the opportunity to build 
relationships to counterstereotypic representatives of the 'other side' as e. g. the 
one that is brought up to see the people separated from the 'cause' or the political 
problems faced in the conflict. At the same time, they build relationships to 
people that normally represent the stereotypic image of the antagonists or the 
extremists in this particular case.
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This is reported to be a positive aspect of the program by the participants. 
They also emphasise how they keep in contact between gatherings. Yet, it is 
difficult to meet, especially those representing the 'other side' in the conflict.
6.1.2 Gatherings and Group Processes 
The MEP program differs from other dialogue programs or conflict resolution 
initiatives, in the way it focuses on transformational leadership, social activities and 
"Learning by discovery through relationships". By this it can be seen as a dual 
approach focusing on the building of trust and relationships on the one hand and 
conflict resolution and management skills on the other. The activities and different 
workshops, though, seem to be important in strengthening the relationships. At the 
same time, building relationships contribute to skills such as showing respect for 
others and detect boundaries of what to talk about and what not to talk about, even if 
it is tempting to stress your own point of view. 
According to Asgeir Føyen, one relational aspect was chosen as a theme for 
each gathering. The first was listening. The facilitators used a minimum of teaching 
procedures, but rather asked some questions that they let the participants explore for 
themselves. The questions could be as easy as: "Why do we listen to other people?" 
and "How do we listen?" (Føyen, 2006 [interview]). The participants worked in 
smaller groups, and the group constellations changed so that all of them would get the 
chance to know each other better.
One of the Israeli participants thought that social activities were important for 
the connections:
"I think that the MEP organizers really put a lot of efforts in organizing trips and social 
experiences to us, like ice skating and skiing in the mountains, and I do not know what 
else. Yes, we went to trips like to meeting people and those kinds of interactions really 
helped us talking and experience the everyday like it would have been in Israel only it 
was everyday like in Norway, and those days were really beneficial for the connection."
When asked about the other workshops that they had, and whether she/he found 
them to be useful, the same participant answered:
"I think that mostly it helped everyone to be lined together, so everyone would know 
what to be expected…it's also in the social experience. We know now how to better 
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listening… how should we talk and how should we do things. Everyone knows what to 
expect… Everyone knows what is expected from us, how do we behave as good 
leaders…so we have sort of learnt everything together, we grew up into it together and 
this has been very beneficial for the friendships….And we all knew that we wanted to do 
something different, we all knew that we wanted to push this friendship forward, this 
program forward. …Everything just happens getting there. We are in this thing together, 
and we are still just on the way, we are still just enjoying the way, and we have this go, 
and everyone has to go together.."
Another Israeli participant emphasised the importance of the social activities, yet 
wanted to highlight the need for the MEP to spread its influence to larger 
segments of the Middle East society:
"Of course you feel closer when you track together in all these beautiful places in 
Norway. We also had some seminars with leaders from the business arena, e. g the prime 
minister of Estonia. When we were in these workshops together it makes us closer. You 
can make people feel good together, but this is a very small group. How can you make 
peace much wider? You have to coordinate this process. If you take the right people in 
the way that they have an open mind, you can get them to be closer…But this is in a 
small level. The question is how to make it wider."
The same participant also pointed at the spill over effect of the program:
"We felt closer and people ask us about the program and we deliver our feelings to other 
people.[X] said that only two persons knew [she/he] was joining the process:  
[her/his]father and [her/his] boss. Now [she/he] is telling everyone and everyone is also 
asking questions and even wants to contribute, and be a part of it. I think in this way these 
activities have made this change in us".
The personal value was also emphasised:
"…the MEP is a huge prize for me. It should give me the tools not to be just a leader, but 
to be a good leader. Most of the participants are young, 24 to35, and not all of us are 
seeing ourselves in the political arena like me. The MEP is giving me a continuing 
workshop, support and experience for the career that I want to make, and the change that 
I want to take part in."
A Palestinian answered:
"The most important skill that I learnt is to listen, and actually to listen to the other side. I 
just want to repeat that on the first times I was there it was not easy for me just to sit in 
the same room or listen to them speaking or giving their opinions. And I think the most 
important skill I learnt is to listen, and actually, in a way, to respect that they are 
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speaking. Not respecting what they are saying, but respect that they are speaking so I can 
listen."
Explaining why listening is so important, an Israeli participant said that:
"I think the basic rule is that you give the other person an opportunity to say everything 
that he wants to say. This is a very important tool. It is important also for you. Then you 
learn how the other person thinks. When somebody speaks to you and also listen, you 
feel that you understand him, and it is also easier to convince him to change. Ground rule: 
Listen! It sounds very basic, and is probably a very natural thing for you- but not for us-
laughs-. We also had a mediation work shop. We learnt how to become mediators. It was 
very good to have that experience also. From being the one with the cause, to becoming 
the one observing everyone and make compromises between people. So it gives again a 
lot of tools, personally and generally."
One of the Jordanians, seeing the conflict partly as an outsider made other 
comments:
"..the relationship aspect with the other participants which are people from other 
countries….Israel, Palestine and Norway, was a very important part……. And maybe for 
us as Jordanians seeing Israelis and Palestinians being able to work together was also a 
very important part of the program that if you take people out of the conflict itself they 
are both humans and they both want a common goal, and how to be able to reach that is 
what we need ….There is a common goal between two parties which was very important 
in my mind…..what I can say on the individual basis about cooperation and people 
getting to know each other is that people was able to work together to come up with 
activities and ideas of programs. Nothing yet have been implemented. This should be the 
next phase of the MEP now, but at this point it was joint relationship building with the 
participants of the program."
One of the Palestinian participants has not as high hopes for governments, but 
rather for the people. She/ he feels strongly about the MEP:
"Generally speaking, it's unique. I was part of many peace movements and peace 
activities with Palestinians and Israelis together, but the MEP is a unique experience as 
far as I see it, as far as I also hear feedback from my friends….I see it as unique 
experience because I believe, and many people friends in my age believe in the same way 
that if we really want to end the Israeli/Palestinian conflict…Than it's gonna be between 
people, it's not gonna be between governments…We have history together and probably 
we share the same blood together because there are Palestinian Jews. So probably their 
extended families are now fighting….. It is unique because it is bringing people such as 
me who are not part of any government, who are not part of any influential organization. 
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It is bringing me to talk, to build something, to build a very strong relationship, 
constructive relationship not destructive, with people same age, same characteristics as 
me from the Israeli side. ..I haven't been in such a program before. .."
The responds of the participants emphasise the importance of being 
together, doing something together and learning skills together, that makes them 
closer as a group. This is both because they get to know each other through the
activities, but also because of the work in groups, that gives them a feeling of 
being united, following the same kind of program and following the same path 
and experiencing a joint process. Their goals vary, as they have chosen different 
careers and professions in their individual lives, yet, they all seem to feel that the 
program gives them important skills that are useful also in their everyday lives.
Some focus on peace between common citizens, while others focus on the 
influence of leaders. At the same time, they all focus on the importance of 
people like themselves working together towards the superordinate goal of peace 
in the region.
6.1.3 Political Issues and Ground Rules
As a starting point the ideal was complete openness in the group meetings, and there 
should be nothing that one could not talk about. Yet, as reported by the facilitators, 
not all subjects are fit to make the relations between the participants stronger at this 
point in time. Some issues are damaging for the relationships because they create 
hostility. As building strong and lasting relationships is the main objective of the 
program, the facilitators found it necessary to make some ground rules regarding the 
dialogues and rounds of talks during gatherings. Respecting the feelings of the others 
has been important in this regard, and as the trust between the participants is growing, 
the threshold of what can be discussed can be lowered. According to Asgeir Føyen, it 
is also not necessary to discuss issues that one has no impact on at this point in time, 
if these issues only serve to cause frustration and aggression in the group (Føyen, 
2006 [interview]). The focus on ground rules, made by the participants together with 
the facilitators from the Abildso team, have shown to be very important for the 
continuation of the program.
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Politics and religion are some issues that are not yet to be discussed in the 
gatherings and one are not allowed to use words that are of an accusing nature. 
According to the facilitators the participants have showed some relief regarding these 
ground rules as they keep away the temptation of discussing certain issues. It also 
gives the facilitators an opening for intervention in the process, as they serve as 
supervisors. The ground rules are only there to protect the relations and can be 
changed along with the process.
One of the Israeli participants were asked which parts of the program 
she/he thought were conducive to bringing the participants closer to each other 
as a group, and answered:
"We have had the rules from the beginning that we don't speak about politics. We 
decided that if somebody wants to stop a discussion about an issue, we stop it. We do not 
want to fight each other, sometimes we just have to leave it. This is something that also 
gives me clues for life. Personally I may have some political discussion with some of the 
members, not with everyone of course. Sometimes when I speak with someone he wants 
to stop it. This is the point. Something that I got from this project, some of the benefits, is 
that sometimes in discussions you feel that you have to express yourself, and that it is 
very important to say what you are thinking. But then you realize at some point that even 
if you did not say it, so what? If you want to make a change you have to listen to the 
other and try to understand why he is thinking in this way, then you can decide to 
make a change. And it really works."
When asked whether or not the ground rules represent a new tool in addressing 
issues of conflict, the same participant answered:
"Ground rules are basic tools. If we don't have them we can not make a discussion. I was 
participating in a conference in Italy between Israelis and Palestinians. The Italian 
government and the EU arranged it. It was not connected to MEP, but was something
else. They asked me if I wanted to come to help one NGO, I have helped them many 
times in different issues, and they asked if I wanted to come to one conference. If you 
don't have these ground rules all the time you loose the goal, you loose the point, you go 
to not important issues." 
She/he continued by explaining a particular incident from the MEP:
"We had a crisis in our team when one of the participants said Palestinian authorities,
when the other wanted to say Palestinian state. They discussed just the term, and got into 
a strong struggle. The Palestinian said, if you do not say Palestinians but just say 
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Palestinian authority, I will not continue the project, and went out of the room. [X] broke 
the ground rules. Then the Norwegians and the other participants were very stressed and 
worried but he came back and went on as nothing had happened. But if we did not have 
the ground rules and it was like this all the time and we don't solve or learn anything just 
want to prove that you are right and the other one is wrong."
Another participant, also from the Israeli side answered:
"First of all, we were not allowed to talk about politics and I think that this is a most 
important thing. If we would just speak about politics the minute we got there, we would 
never get to know one another, we would never get to know the stories of one another, 
dreams, hopes, we would be just arguing all the time, so it's very easy to come and argue 
about those things because we live with them every day. So I think that forbidding us to 
talk about politics got us to really know the people, and brought us to the relational stage, 
where we stand today."
The MEP organisers have been criticised for keeping the political issues, 
perceived by many as the fundamental issues of the conflict, outside the scope of their 
program. While some of the critics find it unrealistic to approach the conflict without 
addressing the more basic issues of dispute, the facilitators put it the other way around
saying that the good relations have to come first.  Being a non-political or 
nongovernmental organisation is important in this regard. Being non-political makes 
them free to have a more long-term engagement or perspective than e.g. politicians 
and governmental offices that have to account for the programs they support regularly 
and within shorter periods of time (Føyen, 2006 [interview]). As shown in the 
interviews, the comments made by the participants, to a large extent, support the 
notions made by the facilitators.
6.1.4 Conflict Prone vs. Peaceful Home Environments 
According to the program facilitators, Norway was chosen as the place to have the 
first meetings for practical reasons. 
• It has been difficult and sometimes even impossible to meet in the Middle East. The 
Israelis can not travel around easily in the neighbouring countries, and the 
Palestinians can not easily get a permit to go to Israel. Jordan has been a compromise, 
but some families and friends feel uncertainty towards sending their family members 
even to this part of the region.
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• It is positive for the process that the participants get away from the emotional stress 
that follows the everyday life in the region, to be able to calm down, relax and feel 
safe. In Norway all the participants feel safe. This seems to have the effect of making 
things possible that was perceived to be impossible in the home environments.
• Because the program organisers from the Abildso cooperation are situated in Norway 
and they have the Abildsø farm that serves as a good place for the gatherings, Norway 
became a natural choice. This also made the recruiting of host families easier. There 
were originally some difficulties in recruiting hosts for the participants, but the 
families that chose to take part in the process all feel that they have benefited from the 
program through the relationships they now have developed. Host families have also 
made new connections in their home environments in Norway through this process, 
and they have reported that their knowledge of the Middle East has grown and 
prejudices have been challenged. (Føyen, 2006 [interview])
Many of the participants made comments about the difference between Norway 
and the Middle East, and how the Norwegian environment made them feel safer. 
When asked about how experiences in the everyday life in the region challenge their 
views of the other participants, they point to the fear of terrorism or targeted killings. 
One of the participants, from the Palestinian, side said that:
"Yes, off course, yes there are days and certain things that happens and when I loose my 
temper by looking at the negative sides. When I see a suicide bombing or when I see a 
curfew in my city, or whenever I call my mom and she tells me about how bad the 
situation is I get really angry, and the hatred inside me rises up a bit, or not even a bit. It 
rises up, the hate, the anger, lot of things. Of course there are times when I believe that I 
can be a suicide bomber, and my friend can be a suicide bomber because of all the stress 
we are under. And we identify the stress as the Israeli occupation, so, definitely I can 
negatively think of the other side. I can think that it is not working, peace is not gonna 
bring me anything. It is only war and that's it. But, then, when I calm down, as is the most 
likely, I become the person I am. There is enough bloodshed. I don't want to loose anyone 
else, so. I don't want anyone to loose anyone special or dear to them…."
Another, from the Israeli side confirms the difficulties, yet points at how 
everyone is not to blame:
"That was a very hard question. Because I do feel, still very close to them, and at the 
same time I feel very, very angry, and I think it is a natural thing. When there is a terrorist 
attacking, anger is the most natural thing to feel. And I can not prevent myself from 
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hating whoever did that or whoever educated him. I know my friends don't have anything 
to do with that but I still think that their school system and their educational system is 
corrupt and I think that ….I do have a lot of blame in me, towards them, and it usually 
comes stronger after a terror attack."
Yet another, also from the Israeli side explained how some stories emerges that may 
contribute to a lack of trust towards the other side:
"Yes, it does, because.. I will give you one example: I have a friend who has a farm. He 
has a Palestinian also, that works with him on his farm. They were very close friends. It 
was not a friend, but a friend of a friend really. And during the intifada one of the 
workers stabbed him, after they knew each other for a long time and they were like 
friends. My friend told me that this is the way that the Palestinians or Arabs act. They 
don't care about the relationship when it comes to national things. When things like that 
happens (I am not saying my point of view now) but it makes you rethink about the 
project".
One of the Palestinian participants stressed the point that it was hard to really 
understand the conflict from the outside:
"If you want to understand living in a conflict very well, you will have to be in it. That is 
my opinion, my suggestion. There is the daily thing, that even if I explain it to you in ten 
hours, you won't understand it until you see it. That is why I am telling you that it's a 
really different story, and it's a really different thing to go inside the thing or study it from
the outside. "
Answering the question about what it is in the MEP that brings the participants closer 
together, the same participant says:
"I'll tell you why I see the MEP as a different program. It's a picture that you can 
imagine: Bringing actual, loving people. Letting them spend time with real families in 
Norway, making them live the normal life, and you don't feel that you are going for a 
special program. When you go home, you have your bed. You have your friends there. 
You have your family. You don't go to the university or school, you go from the morning 
to the evening and then you go back home, you sit with your family. You speak with 
them, you have dinner. You can go out walking, or do what you feel like... This 
atmosphere makes things so much easier. It makes you feel that you're in a safe place, 
that you… It makes you feel that you're fine."
Contrasting this to the life at home she/he says that:
"We are fighting, and working, not for the big thing that people think that we are working 
for the red colour, the blood that we see. We don't like killing, as people are picturing us 
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all over the world. We are human people fighting for the smallest things that all people, 
that you have every day. You wake up, have your breakfast normally, go walking, then 
going in the shower, going for your school, doing your research, finishing your work, 
having dinner with your family. Then going out, enjoying time with your friends, having 
your normal life. That's the things that we are fighting for, our normal life that you people 
are living every day. And that is why I joined the MEP. I am seeing maybe as a hope, that 
I will get to this point."
Being asked about the importance of the facilitators, one of the Israeli participants 
also emphasised the need to feel safe in the relations:
"For sure. The team itself has a lot of experience. Asgeir has participated in the region in 
the past with the water issues and has a lot of experience. If you don't understand the 
Israelis and Palestinians, you can not coordinate this. We have a very different culture 
and mentality. Also Israelis and Palestinians, but compared to Europe there is a very 
different mentality. …In one-to-one processes you feel that you can share, feel, get 
support to stay in the process and feel safe in the process. It is important because the 
meeting with Palestinians and vice v can give you a lot of bad points if you want a 
specific career in life and even one of the Palestinians say that he might be killed if they 
know that he met Israelis in the  beginning. We can talk about this… Thomas..arranging 
things and facilitating a lot of things. Then we have the coordinators who have a tough 
experience, the Israeli one, from the water negotiations, the Jordanian works in the 
Jordanian institute of diplomacy, she arranged two meetings in Jordan and has a lot of 
experience and patience also. The team is important. Without the Norwegian team it 
could not be done. We could not do it without a neutral ground. If it was in Israel, 
Palestinian territories or even in Jordan, we could not really make it like the way it has 
been in Norway. This is more natural."
Another participant made a point out of the pressure of time in the everyday life, and 
how this makes constraints on the possibilities to meet and work with such programs:
"It's not very easy, because at least in Israel, I don't know how it goes in Norway, but at 
least in Israel, everyone, every young person is trying to fight for his well being, his 
mortgage, salary, car expenses. We work a lot, and also when we study we also work a 
lot because we have to provide. We are not having any allowance, like in Norway. So we 
hardly have free time. ..To find spare time to be together we have to really make time in 
advance, and make a structure. It is not easy. We do it, and I think that we need 
more…it's easier when we go abroad and we meet and we have to adjust ourselves 
to their schedule. To find time in our own schedule, in Israel, just like that, it's 
hard."
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As shown in these comments made by the participants, it is obvious that the 
non hostile environment made possible through arranging the gatherings outside 
the region, but particularly Israel/Palestine has been important. The facilitators 
have also been important adding to a 'safer' atmosphere were all the participants 
feel that they will be heard and are cared for on an equal basis. They also 
emphasise the harsh reality in their countries, both regarding the issues of 
conflict and constantly being reminded of violence and perpetrator acts, but also 
of everyday challenges as raising money for themselves and their families. This 
is leaving out time for extra activities. At the same time, experiencing life 
outside the region opens up for thoughts and possibilities that do not seem 
obvious in their home environments.
6.2 CONCLUSIONS FROM THE INTERVIEWS
Drawing conclusions from the interviews, what the MEP program has really 
succeeded in is the formation of friendships that expands the borders and problems 
faced in the everyday life of intractable conflict. They have managed to build trust 
between the participants and also towards the facilitators in the Abildso team. 
Resulting from this is an expanded and more differentiated view of the ‘other side’ 
particularly on the issues of trust. Even though this trust may not generalize to the 
broader sphere of the different populations, it seems to have brought some hope in the 
participants and also given them explicit people to ‘work with’ on the other side. 
People that are able to and most of all, willing to, make an effort to understand their 
thoughts and feelings.
Four important features of the program seem to have brought about this 
development in the program participants: 
• The ground rules, leaving out politics and issues that are not yet ready to be up for 
discussion. With this comes also the practicing of listening skills, showing respect for 
the others’ points of view even when you do not agree with them, and ‘putting 
yourself in the shoe of the other’. This was expressed by one of the participants as 
“seeing the issue from another corner of the triangle”.
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• Facilitators, supervising and guiding in the relations is reported to be necessary even 
after the participants now have known each other for more than two years and 
constantly keep in contact. 'Hot issues', like politics and the historical narratives can 
not yet be raised without leading to hostility and problems in the relations. Even if 
progress has been made, the participants still do not think they are ready to continue 
the program without the supervision of facilitators. This can also be seen in relation 
to;
• The long-term perspective, which makes the efforts of being part of such a project 
worth while even when changes are not seen right away. The long term perspective 
seem to have given the participants a feeling of being part of a joint effort where they 
have to contribute by keeping in touch and bringing the program forward. 
• Meetings outside the region, which gives the participants the opportunity to rest, put 
the problems of their everyday lives aside and concentrate on the friendship issues in 
stead of keeping distance to the 'perpetrators'. This is also an obvious part of making a 
less hostile atmosphere for the program.
In addition to this, some of the participants emphasise the positive aspect of 
meeting people from the other side that are more or less like yourself and that they 
experienced meeting friends from the other side that they ‘clicked’ with instantly. This 
may strengthen the assumption, made also by the facilitators, that the personality 
variable is an important one, as you will find people sharing similar characteristics 
also in very different political or social environments. At the same time, the 
participants saw the integration of people also from extremist groupings as one of the 
big strengths of the program. As to say, the constellation of the group and selection 
of participants may be an important part of the success of the program. Closer 
examinations of optimal group constellations could thus be an important factor 
to be considered in future studies of this and other programs. 
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7 Comparing the Findings to the Theories 
In this chapter the MEP is discussed in relation to the various theories. In the first 
section the recommendations of the Optimal Contact Strategy is discussed, 
emphasising how the conditions of the strategy relates to this particular setting. How 
the findings may add to the contact literature is emphasised through the way this 
program has managed to build constructive intergroup friendships. This is mentioned
by e.g. Pettigrew (1997) to be essential for contact to lead to generalizable decreases 
in prejudice towards the out-group. In the second section, the findings are discussed in 
relation to collective narratives and how these represent particularly difficult or 
emotionally challenging issues of the conflict. In the third section of this chapter I
discuss the findings in relation to the various definitions of conflict resolution and the 
model of potential transfer effects of ICR, proposed by Fisher. The conclusions from 
the comparisons, the research question and comments on validity are discussed in the 
last section.
7.1 HOW DO THE FINDINGS CORRESPOND TO THE THEORIES?
7.1.1 The MEP and 'The Optimal Contact Strategy'
The first recommendation of the optimal strategy is that the contact should be:
'regular and frequent'. In the MEP program this has showed to be difficult, mainly 
because of difficulties to raising the funding required for organizing the meetings. Yet 
the first meetings were quite frequent, contributing also to the continuity of the 
process. The participants have also contributed to maintaining this continuity by 
keeping in contact through internet connections and telephone calls. They report, 
though, that this continuity is needed for the program to continue and progress to be 
made and that it will be difficult to maintain the program if the meetings will not be 
held more often in the future. It is emphasised, though, by the participants, that the 
relations will continue even if the program would have to end. This is suggesting that 
strong relations have been established within a rather short period of time. As 
discussed below, the long-term perspective and frequency of meetings may be more 
important in addressing the more difficult issues, not yet talked about in the MEP.
The MEP also involves a: 'balanced ratio of in-group to out-group members'.
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This offers the opportunity for the participants to engage in friendships, involving 
people both from their own and the other side. The importance of encountering parties 
from the other side is obvious, giving the participants the possibility to get to know 
'the enemy' and challenge stereotypic perceptions and images that evolve in such 
conflicts. In addition, the participants report a sense of 'feeling the other side'. They 
experience that they can be real friends with the others, trust them and see them as 
accountable. Regarding the hostility of the context they are normally in, this is a new 
experience for many, giving hopes, instead of strengthening enemy images of 'us 
versus them'.  This can be seen in relation to two of the other recommendation, made 
by the contact approach. The recommendation emphasising that the contact should:
'involve interaction with a counterstereotypic member of another group'; and the 
one prescribing that contact should: 'be with a person who is deemed a typical 
representative member of another group'.
These are contradictory towards each other, and not easily interpreted. In the MEP 
program, emphasis have been made to include representatives of the broader sphere of 
the societies of the two sides, yet they are all selected for the program due to some 
characteristics that are probably not encompassed in the stereotypic images of 'the 
other' on either side. For the Palestinians, stereotypic images definitely followed the 
extremist Israeli who, in the beginning of the program was a settler. Settlers are feared 
and hated by many Palestinians and even by moderate Israeli Jews in Israel. One of 
the Palestinians was on the first meeting with the others wearing a Muslim 'hood' that 
he had pulled down his face, triggering images of terrorists and fundamentalist Arabs 
causing anxiety in at least one of the Israeli participants. One of the Israelis reported 
that even her/his image of Jordanians was challenged by getting to know the very well 
educated Jordanians in the program contrasting her/his original views. Many of the 
participants did not know any representative of at least one of the four countries 
included in the program before they joined the MEP. Therefore, most of their views of 
would have to be based on stereotypes and not differentiated views that develop 
through acquaintances and friendships. An important difference between coexistence 
work in intractable conflicts and work in areas where the conflict is not a part of all 
areas of society is that in intractable conflicts, many people never have the possibility 
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to even meet representatives of the other side under peaceful conditions. This adds to 
the importance of programs like the MEP. Giving people the chance to meet and share 
their thoughts and ideas with people from the 'other side'. 
Even though the participants report that the views they have of participants of the 
other side are not generalizable to 'the other side' in its broadest sense, the emotional 
changes that have happened in this case might be just as important. In my opinion this 
may even be the most important contribution of the MEP, and where it stands out in 
comparison to other programs. It is hard to say which of the conditions or parts of the 
program that has actually triggered this development.
The MEP certainly involve a : 'genuine acquaintance potential', and the contact 
in the program is: 'personalized and involve genuine friendship formation'. In the 
sense of the MEP this has meant that the participants have been given a possibility to 
meet people of the same age that are  in similar positions in life also having similar 
goals and wishes for the future. The possibility to meet as such has also been 
important, as meetings with people from the other side are very hard to maintain in 
times of intractable conflict. In this regard, the notion that contact should: 'occur
across a variety of social settings and situations', may also have been important.
Many of he MEP participants mentioned the different social activities contributed to 
bringing them closer. Yet, for the MEP participants, the emphasis has been put on the 
necessity of meeting each other outside the conflict setting. This can be seen in 
relation to the prescription that the contact should be: 'Free from anxiety or other 
negative emotions'. Creating such an atmosphere though, is not easy in regions of 
ongoing intractable conflict as all the participants are constantly being kept aware of 
their social obligations and loyalties to their respective societies in their everyday 
lives. When taken out of the everyday setting, they are given the opportunity to 
experience life in a society not torn by conflict, and this has been crucial to the 
possibilities of friendships to grow.
So has the fact that the program is: 'organized around cooperation toward the 
achievement of a superordinate goal'. This prescription is easy to follow in 
traditional coexistence work involving segregated groups that are not in conflict, yet 
in larger conflicts such as the one in Israel/Palestine, most conflict resolution efforts 
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seem to evolve in the common frame of 'negotiations',  'finding optimal solutions', 
'make settlements for peace' and 'best alternatives to a negotiated agreement'. Implicit 
in these approaches is the notion of 'us vs. them', bringing competition to it, rather 
than cooperation and collective superordinate goals. In this regard, the MEP 
organizers have found it necessary to put the political issues of the conflict aside, 
replacing them with the creation of new goals and agendas, agreed upon by all the 
participants, encouraging cooperation and new ways of dealing with the conflict. In 
the MEP, this process, called the 'vision process' was done quite early, on the second 
and third gathering. This approach have shown to have preventive effects regarding 
deadlocks and hostility, even if the discussion of political issues show to be inevitable 
in a later phase of the program. The goal and initiative of the MEP obviously also has 
to be: 'evaluated as "important" to the participants involved'. In the MEP, 
commitment to the program values and initiative has been emphasised from the 
beginning, through the selection process, and is later showed by the strong efforts 
made by the participants to stay in touch.  As mentioned by one of the participants, the 
ones that are not committed enough realizes this and decides to leave the program. 
This has happened to two of the original participants.
What the participants report to have been of primary importance is also the efforts 
made by the facilitators contributing to the safe and predictable framework for the 
gatherings. This can be seen in relation to both the prescription that the contact needs 
to: 'occur between individuals who share equality of status' and should: 'be 
normatively and institutionally sanctioned'. Because of the ground rules, agreed 
upon by all the participants in the first phase of the program, they all have the same 
guidelines to follow and the right to give their opinions, yet, not by all means. The 
facilitators supervise and intervene if some of the rules are broken. The participants 
heavily emphasise that friendships would not have evolved if political issues had been 
discussed in the first phases of the program. This would probably have charged the 
gatherings with hostility. As it is widely known that a non-hostile environment is 
necessary for contact to lead to the reduction of prejudice, this notion should, in my 
opinion, by all means be taken seriously.
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7.1.2 Political Issues and the Two Competing Narratives
The political issues and the narratives of the past, are beyond doubt the most 
emotional and difficult aspects of the transformation that has to be made if peace is 
going to be the future of Israel/Palestine. Findings from the MEP though, propose that 
addressing these issues may not be the best place to start. The building of trust 
between conflictants in intractable conflicts like the one in Israel/Palestine is a time 
consuming process. The actors from the different parties need to see that they can 
create a future together even if it, as a first step, is only on a low scale basis. The 
damaging impact of living a life totally consumed by conflict is also obvious in the 
way that at least some of the participants need some time outside the region before 
their 'guards' and distrust regarding people from the other side can be let down and the 
building of trust and relationships can evolve.
As mentioned by Salomon, the legitimization of the collective narrative of the 
other side means that one has to acknowledge the right of the other's narrative to exist 
and 'accept its validity in its own terms'. Even if the collective narratives of the other 
side have not yet successfully been addressed in the MEP, the participants have come 
a long way. This can be seen in the comments made by various participants mentioned 
before, as e.g. the one saying that: ' I got to know them…in general I learnt that there 
is another side. And that they are not the only ones to blame. Every conflict has two 
sides'. This is a long step on the way of trying to see the perspectives also of the other 
side. Another, saying that: '..I think that the most important skill I learnt is to listen, 
and actually, in a way, to respect that they are speaking. Not respecting what they are 
saying, but….that they are speaking so I can listen', Also a big step on the way 
towards acknowledging that the other side also has the right to speak and have their 
own opinion. For people in intractable conflicts, that have grown up witnessing or 
hearing stories of loved ones being hurt or killed by people on the other side, being 
taught to blame the other side for all their sufferings, these are important
advancements. 
Following the argument of Rouhana and Bar-Tal saying that it is very difficult 
to produce a vision of peace in societies 'embroiled in intractable conflicts whose 
dynamics are not conducive to such vision', the advancements made by the MEP are 
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in fact substantial. They have developed their slogans of courage, commitment and 
compassion, realizing that they, in the process they are in, need courage and 
persistence if they want to promote a change. 
7.1.3 The MEP as Interactive Conflict Resolution
The MEP can definitely be seen as a conflict resolution program focusing on 
peacebuilding through its emphasis on 'long-term relationships between conflictants'.
The transfer of what Galtung refers to as the cultural aspects of conflict is also 
addressed by the way participants are given tools to handle conflicts in a more 
peaceful way, through compassion, courage and commitment, and also through 
transformational leader skills and listening. The psychological aspects of conflict are 
also addressed as the participants get to know people and build friendships crossing 
the lines of conflict, and also practice ways of seeing the many sides and perspectives 
of the conflict. Some would probably argue, though, that as the basic issues of conflict 
are not squarely faced by the program, it is incomplete in terms of how conflict 
resolution approaches in intractable conflicts have been organized in the past.
As I have mentioned earlier, this may not be a shortcoming of the program, but 
may rather be a necessary part. A more gradual process, focus on the building of trust 
has in the MEP been important for the sake of preventing hostility and deadlocks. This 
may also give lessons for other programs.
It is not easy though, to account for the transfer effects of the program to the 
broader sphere of the Israeli/Palestinian society. The participants selected for the 
program can all be characterized as preinfluentials, some even influentials following 
the categorizations of Fisher (1997: 192). The participants are also in the process of 
including 'peers' in the program. These are people from their own spheres of influence 
that they believe will be fit for the MEP and contribute to making the program wider, 
reaching a broader part of their respective societies. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, one of the participants, in the middle of forming a political career, explicitly 
pointed at the importance of engaging leaders in such programs:
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"… e.g. Ariel Sharon in the last two years decided to make a step [disengagement] that 
was very unpopular in the beginning, yet he made it, and everybody accepted it, and it 
changed things. You can change people all the time, this is important and a lot of NGOs 
are making these changes, but the most influential aspect is to change leaders. If you 
make leaders more open in their mind.. it can make peace… 
She/he emphasised the importance of knowing people in higher positions also on the 
other side: 
"As I see it, I hope some people with connections to the MEP will be in the parliament 
and government. -Maybe participants, peers of peers of peer groups for instance, and the 
same on the Palestinian side and the Jordanian side. I hope it will become wider, and the 
personal contacts will play a very important role if there is a mistrust between the two 
sides or maybe political leaders from both sides can make a phone call and talk directly to 
someone they trust, and get information about what is going on. If, we have enough 
people that have this MEP experience, and also become influential enough; then we 
really change the area."
Even if the work they have done still involves only a small group of people, their 
network is continually growing, making their experiences known also to people 
who trust them in their own communities. As reported by the participants, the 
process of bringing peers into the program has not been difficult, as people tend 
to show interest in the initiatives made by the MEP. The interest in joining the 
program was also strong in the initial selection phase, suggesting as reported also 
by Fisher (1997: 198) that the willingness to cooperate and make joint efforts to
build peace is there.
7.2 CONCLUSION AND GENERAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE MEP 
7.2.1 The Propositions of the Research Question
Answering the research question, this study is not contrasting former assumptions 
made by the contact strategy. Yet, the reported experiences from the MEP strengthen 
the conclusions, made by Dixon et. al (2005), that there is a need for additional 
knowledge addressing the issues of contact work in intractable conflict. Knowledge 
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about the context of the people involved and the problems and issues they are facing 
are best understood through conversations and relations to people in the region. In 
addition the need for third parties facilitating meetings between antagonist groups are 
obvious and their role in such conflicts could even be extended by adding to it the 
importance of a 'neutral ground' outside the region representing a non-hostile 
environment that are not easily found in areas of intractable or protracted social 
conflicts.
Sensitivity also has to be shown regarding which issues to address in such 
programs, and at what point in time. This may be a contribution also to traditional 
conflict resolution workshops, or suggest that peace and reconciliation programs like 
the MEP could complement such workshops through its focus on relationships and 
building of trust, rather than primarily addressing the political issues and 
controversies. Disturbing issues, embroiled in the identity of both the Israeli and the 
Palestinian societies, seem to be dependent on gradual, long-term efforts like the 
MEP, showing patience and understanding regarding the emotional distress related to 
this part of the conflict.
In addition the study supports the notion made by Pettigrew that intergroup 
friendships may depend on long-term efforts. Based on this study, one can not say 
whether or not it is a necessary condition, but prolonged contact certainly seems to 
strengthen the relations built trough group processes in the first three gatherings.
7.2.2 Narratives in Research and Recommendations
Adding to the specific propositions of the research question, I found the narrative 
perspective to be very useful, highlighting much needed aspects of research on 
conflict resolution and peacebuilding. As mentioned also by Asgeir Føyen, much of 
the knowledge needed for conflict resolution workshops are already in the 
participants. The objective of the facilitators should be to create an open and trusting 
atmosphere where the ideas and thoughts of the people involved can be put forward 
and discussed.  The participants of the MEP are possibly representing a larger portion 
of their respective societies that have already made reflections about how they want 
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things to change even if it means cooperation rather than a continuation of the 
fighting, thus listening to their stories is an invaluable way of examining these issues.
Many of the participants also gave positive feedback regarding the interest in 
their program shown by this study. The interest they showed in sharing their 
experiences strongly strengthens the assumptions also made by Fisher that participants 
and the affected parties show to be positive towards such efforts. In this study, this 
showed to be even more so for interviews than questionnaires, maybe assuming that 
interviews make it easier for the people involved to articulate what they truly think 
and feel. In my opinion, interviews as a way of measuring and exploring issues of 
intractable conflicts and peace processes should be given value also in relation to its 
potential positive effects on the interviewee.
7.2.3 The Validity of the Findings
Relying on the consistency between the reports of the participants that were 
interviewed and also the responds from the program manager, a high degree of 
internal validity may be assumed for the study. As the participants reported that they 
had not actually read the questionnaire before my interviews, there is a very low
possibility that conversations about the issues discussed prior to my phone calls have 
contributed to this consistency. The long time that has past since the last gathering is 
adding to the reliability of results, as the responds are probably due to own reflections 
rather then the actual 'spirit' of the time of the gatherings. 
Because the findings are not disconfirmed by prior theories and research based 
on similar efforts, but rather add to some of the knowledge, one might assume that 
there also is a degree of external validity to the study. This though is not readily 
measured in these kinds of studies. Hopefully, the study may also show to have
pragmatic validity38 contributing to ideas and motivations for future organizations and 
programs addressing attitudes and human relations in conflicts.
38 As explained in chapter two.
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Overall Conclusion: Lessons for Peace Work, in Israel/Palestine and 
General
The Israeli/Palestinian conflict has been characterized as an intractable or protracted 
one, due to its ongoing nature of disputes that are deeply rooted in the history and 
identity of the Palestinian and the Jewish people. By this it shares features with 
similar conflicts that have started out as disputes regarding the rights to own land, but 
has become complicated by the more complex issues involving religion, identity, 
security and other basic human needs. Representing a threat also to international 
security, it has become a conflict of symbolic value to actors surrounding the region 
as well as actors in other parts of the world. 
This study specifically addresses the question of how knowledge of the Middle 
East Program for Young Leaders (MEP) may contribute to the theory and 
recommendations for conflict resolution practices in intractable conflicts. This is done 
through interviews of the participants and the program manager of the program, and 
results are compared to prior recommendations of the optimal contact strategy, 
coexistence work and theories of conflict resolution. The review of the literature 
reveals that psychological mechanisms in such conflict resolution work is not given 
enough emphasis, particularly in intractable conflicts, where conflictants experience 
extreme conditions of threats, fears, and sufferings. 
The study suggests that coexistence work in intractable conflicts like the one in 
Israel/Palestine encounter challenges that are not sufficiently addressed in the 
recommendations made by the optimal contact strategy. All the recommendations may
not be equally necessary. E.g. the condition of regularity and frequency of contact has 
in this particular study shown to be of minor importance, as some of the participants 
connected quite instantly, emphasising also the importance of the personality variable.  
This, in addition to other findings of the study implies that the conditions of the 
optimal contact approach also are not sufficient for prejudice to be replaced by 
cooperation, friendship and trust. This is particularly due to the extreme conditions of 
the Israeli /Palestinian conflict. Comparing the findings to the contact literature, much 
of the recommendations are confirmed to have positive effects on cooperative patterns 
between the participants in this study, yet some additional specifications are needed. 
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One is the long-term perspective that is necessary for the development of 
relations that are strong enough to handle the emotionally challenging issues of the 
conflict. This assumption is strengthened by emphasis made in prior coexistence work 
by e.g. Salomon, addressing the importance of collective narratives and legitimizing 
the views of 'the other'. In the MEP case, a gradual approach seems to have given 
effects, mentioned by Salomon to be early steps of change in the susceptibility to such 
changes.
In relation to the prior recommendation, the study also shows  the importance 
of avoiding difficult and disturbing issues in the initial phases of such programs. Even 
if the recommendations from the contact approach propose that the environment 
should be friendly and free of competition, this is not sufficient for the 
recommendations needed in intractable conflicts where the affected societies are 
consumed by issues that represent quite the opposite.  Thus, as chosen by the 
participants and organizers of the MEP, it might be necessary to avoid the political 
issues of the conflict in such programs.
In the MEP this is made possible through the ground rules of the program. 
These have shown to contribute to a predictable and trusting atmosphere where 
opinions can be shared while at the same time avoiding hostility.  The ground rules 
are agreed upon by all the parties involved and may be adjusted as the relationships 
are getting stronger, thus other programs may have to invent their own rules and 
boundaries. Yet, the ground rules from the MEP may give guidance to such 
procedures. 
The meetings on neutral grounds, outside the region, were also reported to have 
positive effects adding to the less hostile atmosphere and helping to keep the minds of 
the participants off issues and difficulties of their everyday lives.
Another part of the MEP, relating also to the personality aspect, is the process 
of selecting participants. The participants selected for the program showed to be quite 
open to change and cooperation. Being given the opportunity to meet and connect
with people on the other side of the conflict that shared some of the characteristics as 
themselves was reported to be of great value.
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The selection of participants may also show to be important for the transfer 
effects to larger spheres of their respective communities, even on the level of higher 
diplomacy and decision making. As mentioned by Asgeir Føyen, though, the 
independence regarding political positions and formal obligations in parliaments and 
decision making offices is contributing to the continuity of the program. It may be 
important for such programs to be successful over time that participants selected for 
the programs, even when being in governmental offices, have a long time perspective 
on participating and a personal commitment superseding the time they remain in 
office.
The success of the MEP program in building long lasting intergroup friendships 
is all in all based on a joint effort by the Abildso team and the participants themselves. 
The long-term and open ended process is based on sensitivity regarding issues and 
needs of the various parties in the program. The various conditions mentioned in the 
contact literature, of contact involving e.g. a balanced number of in-group and out-
group members, being with representatives of a counterstereotypic group and with 
persons deemed to be a typical member of the other group, be free from anxiety or 
other negative emotions and be normatively and institutionally sanctioned seem to
have contributed to the success of building cooperation, empathy and trust among the 
participants. Though, the study strongly suggests that conflict resolution workshops in 
intractable conflicts confront additional challenges. Friendship formation and building 
of trust in such conflicts seem to depend also on some skills as active practitioners. 
According to the Abildso team, these can be brought forward through facilitation or 
learned through active participation in a continuous process. 
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Appendix: Interview Guide for Interviews with Participants
The interviews of the five participants were open ended, but based on the 
following questions:
1. Has the MEP brought about a change in how you see the other participants? 
How?
2. Where there moments where you specifically experienced that your 
relationship to the others changed? Describe: What were you doing? What did 
you feel? How if at all, were the experiences tied to the program?
3. In your view: Has any of the processes of the program been specifically 
important in bringing about cooperation between the participants? Which ones? 
Does this involve activities led by participants? -Facilitators from the Abildso 
team? - Guests?
4.  In your every day life, have you had any experiences that challenge your views 
of the other participants? What kind of experiences? How do they challenge 
these views?
5. Would you say that any of these experiences are more difficult to handle as 
being a part of the MEP? - Or do you handle them or think of them differently 
after being part of the MEP? How were your views of Palestinians, Norwegians 
and Jordanians before you entered the MEP?
6. How is your relationship with the other participants in the time between MEP 
gatherings?
7. During the first gathering in Jordan there was an incident that was chocking to 
all of you. What happened? How did this affect the group and the program of 
the gathering?
8. You have had a MEP workshop leading to three different projects that you 
have been working with in the second and third phase of the program (ethics in 
conflict, documentary, school project) How would you describe the importance 
of these projects? What do they mean to you? What has bringing in peer groups 
meant to you so far?
9. How do you see the MEP in the future? What are your visions for the program? 
How will your relations to the others be in the future?
